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ABSTRACT
Much public commentary has asserted or implied that the
American criminal-justice system unjustly privileges individuals who
commit crimes in corporations and financial markets. This Article
demonstrates that this claim is not accurate—at least not in the ways
commonly believed. Law and practice of sentencing, evidence, and
criminal procedure cannot persuasively be described as privileging the
white collar offender. Substantive criminal law makes charges in
white collar cases easier to bring and harder to defend against than in
other cases. Enforcement institutions, and the political economy in
which they exist, include features that both shelter corporate offenders
and heighten their exposure to criminal liability. Corporate actors
enjoy a large advantage in legal-defense resources relative to others.
That advantage, however, does not pay off quite as one might expect.
A fully developed claim of privilege can be sustained only by showing
that basic American arrangements of criminal law and policing have
been misguided. This argument would fault the justice system for
failing to treat illegal behavior within firms as requiring omnipresent
policing, looser definitions of criminality, the harshest of
punishments, and rethinking of the right to counsel. Those who
believe corporate offenders are privileged should confront the
difficulties that argument entails. And they should be aware of the
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complications that follow from overreliance on punishment to deal
with intractable problems of ex ante regulatory control.
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INTRODUCTION
A popular belief holds that the American criminal-justice system
1
has been favoring those who commit crime in the corporate domain.
1. See generally, e.g., Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–4
(2010) (statement of Sen. Kaufman); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET
ALWAYS WINS 65–95 (2012); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST., JUSTICE INACTION: THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S UNPRECEDENTED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BIG FINANCE (2012),
available
at
http://g-a-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf;
Charles
Ferguson, Obama and Corporate Crime, CORP. CRIME REP., June 11, 2012, at 1, 12–14;
Editorial, Going Soft on Corporate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A26; Joe Nocera,
Biggest Fish Face Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1; Joe Nocera,
How To Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2012, at A19; 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall
Street (CBS News television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/
watch/?id=7390540n; Victoria Finkle, Are Some Banks “Too Big To Jail?,” AM. BANKER (Jan.
22, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_15/are-some-banks-too-big-tojail-1056033-1.html?pg=4; Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables; Arianna Huffington, Send
the Bastards to Jail!, SALON (July 16, 2002, 2:36 PM), http://www.salon.com/2002/07/16/
corporate_reform; Peter Schweizer, Obama’s DOJ and Wall Street: Too Big for Jail?, FORBES
(May 7, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/07/obamas-doj-and-wall-

BUELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

WHITE COLLAR PRIVILEGE

11/26/2013 10:30 AM

825

This charge deserves attention. Harmful wrongs committed with the
powers of large private institutions are pressing concerns for public
policy. If law and legal institutions do not respond seriously to
wrongdoing in business firms, they will fail to protect the public and
may produce or harden inequities in the administration of justice. It is
an important question whether American law and legal institutions
shield the white collar offender without justification.
This Article addresses that question in depth—as to the
individual, not the firm—and finds two perspectives that produce
opposing answers. If one broadly examines the contemporary
criminal-justice machine as it is applied, day in and out, to the serious
white collar offender, one cannot find systematic privilege. Rather,
one can see a case for privilege only from a perspective that blames
foundational arrangements of American criminal justice for having
misconceived the phenomenon of white collar crime. This view would
call for reordering basic punishment scales, renovating substantive
criminal law, creating entirely new modes of policing in the business
world, and rethinking rights to counsel. The conversation invited by
this perspective is worth having. But recent discussions of this subject
have been unproductive and misleading in suggesting that the issues
are more superficial than is true.
Consider the first perspective: in its operation, the present
criminal-justice system routinely favors the corporate criminal. The
overwhelming weight of academic opinion and a slowly broadening
spectrum of public opinion have determined that America’s gigantic,
exceptional system of arresting and incarcerating its people is at least
2
itself broken, if not also opening dangerous social fissures. If one
street-too-big-for-jail; Matt Taibbi, Jon Corzine Is the Original George Zimmerman, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 24, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/joncorzine-is-the-original-george-zimmerman-20120424; Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?,
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isntwall-street-in-jail-20110216 [hereinafter Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?].
2. The literature is too voluminous to cite fully. For some of the major voices, see
generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL
ORDER (2011); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed., 2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
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tunes one ear to claims about American corporate crime and the
other to voices of alarm about the scale and severity of American
criminal justice, the sound can be discordant.
Both assertions—that criminal justice shields the business
criminal while also producing an inhumane and costly “carceral
state”—could be true only if there were some mechanism by which
the power of the American system were diverted from throwing its
full weight at the corporate violator. One would expect to find a place
where the institutions and officials who administer law and criminal
justice engaged in such deflective efforts, as well as reasons for them
regularly to do so.
Efforts to search for such mechanisms in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis have been limited to the press, where discussions
have been more confusing than illuminating. For example, the New
York Times editorial board scolded the U.S. Department of Justice
(Justice Department) for declining to prosecute bankers responsible
3
for practices that unleashed the 2008 financial crisis. The Times
described the relevant conduct as “reckless lending, heedless
4
securitizations, exorbitant paydays and illusory profits.” Without
discussing a legal theory on which such conduct could support a
federal prosecution, the Times speculated that the Justice
Department’s supposed fecklessness resulted from the zeal of its
5
political overseers to please the banking sector. Meanwhile, the New
Yorker published a long exploration of President Obama’s soured
relationship with leading bankers and other corporate chieftains,
warning that his campaign’s poor record in cultivating wealthy
6
contributors might cost the President reelection. All the while, the
Wall Street Journal has steadily beaten a drum of alarm about a
Justice Department it has described as out of control in its zealous
7
pursuit of financiers and public officials.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003); and
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991).
3. Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at SR10.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Jane Mayer, Schmooze or Lose, NEW YORKER, Aug. 27, 2012, at 24.
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Abuse of Privilege, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2007, at A12; Editorial,
Bear Market Victory, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, at A24; Editorial, Black and Blue, WALL ST.
J., July 16, 2007, at A12; Editorial, Brandon and Buffet Redux, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2011, at A14;
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Clearer thinking is in order. It has been some time—perhaps
going back to the work of the sociologist and legal scholar Stanton
Wheeler and his colleagues at Yale in the 1980s, who took up the
project begun by the sociologist Edwin Sutherland in the 1930s—
since the busy legal discussion of crime in corporations has taken a
healthy step back to consider the overall position of the individual
white collar offender in the United States. In the modern legal
academy, the problem of white collar crime has been addressed
mostly by arguing about how to define criminal wrongs and about
8
whether and how to criminalize firms. There is need for
comprehensive discussion of how procedure and institutions treat the
white collar offender—specifically the individual who offends within
the corporate and financial sectors that draw so much of the public’s
attention today.
To assert that the offender in the corporate world is privileged
because of her class is conclusory. The important question is how that
status might affect criminal-justice outcomes. Sutherland, the pathbreaking criminologist who invented the unfortunate but now
inescapable term white collar crime, defined it as “a crime committed
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his
9
occupation.” He really meant it. Sophisticated as his work was in its
Editorial, Corporate Injustice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at A14; Editorial, Department of
Injustice, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2012, at A14; Editorial, Dishonest Prosecutorial Services, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 27, 2010, at A18; Editorial, Enron Overstretch, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2005, at A16;
Editorial, The KPMG Fiasco, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2007, at A20; Editorial, White-Collar Justice,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2008, at A16.
8. For some of the most important works on conceptualizing white collar crime, see
generally STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
“Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963); Dan
M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618–22
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996);
Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1997).
9. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949); see also DAVID WEISBURD,
STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING & NANCY BODE, CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES:
WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 5 (1991) (explaining that Sutherland
was trying to bring attention to ignored criminality, so he moved among “casual” conceptions of
white collar crime based in social status, occupation, and organizational context). For extended
discussion of Sutherland’s influence in a series of essays by sociologists and criminologists, see
generally WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds.,
1992).
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time, Sutherland’s project was to accuse the management class of
10
getting away with the business equivalent of murder.
The bare question of class is not the one pressing hardest at the
11
moment on the legal system, at least not overtly. Today, lawyers
more plausibly define white collar crime as a realm of substantive
criminal offenses that share certain characteristics—in how they are
committed, in the settings where they arise, and in the way statutes
12
define them—and which are committed by a diversity of persons.
10. See John Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 2–3 (1985) (stating, in
an admiring treatment, “Sutherland’s mission was to turn muckraking into sociology”).
11. Cf. WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2 (“White-collar crime evokes images of rich
and powerful Americans often immune from apprehension and prosecution in the criminal
justice system, Americans who can use their power in ways that lead them to be rewarded rather
than punished for their misdeeds.”); id. at 4 (“The idea that the advantaged, like the
disadvantaged, may be prone to criminality, but that their crimes are of a different type, fit
easily into the American tradition of reform.”). Survey research suggests that the public views
forms of white collar crime as equally serious or more serious than forms of street or violent
crime involving comparable degrees of harm. See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen, Jennifer L. Hartman &
Cheryl Lero Jonson, Bad Guys: Why the Public Supports Punishing White-Collar Offenders, 51
CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 31, 39 (2009); Kristy Holtfreter, Shanna Van Slyke, Jason Bratton &
Marc Gertz, Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 50, 57
(2008); Nicole Leeper Piquero, Stephanie Carmichael & Alex R. Piquero, Research Note,
Assessing the Perceived Seriousness of White-Collar and Street Crimes, 54 CRIME & DELINQ.
291, 306 (2008). It is a serious question—though beyond the subject of this Article—whether
social status enables or explains the tendency to violate the law, or at least certain kinds of laws.
See Paul K. Piff, Daniel M. Stancato, Stéphane Côté, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton & Dacher
Keltner, Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 4086, 4089 (2012) (summarizing the results of seven observational and experimental studies
that yielded evidence that positive attitudes toward greed tend to make persons more likely to
engage in and look favorably upon unethical behaviors, and that such attitudes are more
prevalent among persons of higher social classes).
12. See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 62 (“[W]hite-collar criminals are generally much
closer in background to average Americans than to those who occupy positions of great power
and prestige.”). Weisburd and his coauthors’ observation is based on an empirical study of 1,094
federal criminal prosecutions from 1976 to 1978 involving securities fraud, antitrust, bribery,
bank embezzlement, mail and wire fraud, false claims and statements, credit and lendinginstitution fraud, and tax fraud that demonstrated the prevalence of middle-class offenders and
routine offenses. Id. at 9–11, 15, 45–46, 180, app. 1 tbl.A-1; see also HERBERT EDELHERTZ,
NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND
PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 3 (1970) (defining white collar crime as “an illegal act
or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain
money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage” (emphasis omitted)); Stuart P.
Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
32–33 (2004) (suggesting that white collar crime be defined as a category of offenses bearing a
family resemblance because they involve certain forms of diffuse and aggregate harm, certain
forms of moral wrongfulness, and a distinctive role for mens rea). See generally Gilbert Geis,
White Collar Crime: What Is It?, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED, supra note 9, at 31
(summarizing the academic debate about definitions of white collar crime in the period from the
1940s to the 1990s).
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One can hardly overstate how much the practice of prosecuting crime
in the milieu of the business firm (termed here “corporate crime”)
13
has mushroomed since the late 1980s. And today’s management
class, though far from a model of diversity, is open to newcomers in
14
ways that would have been unrecognizable in Sutherland’s day.
The bulk of this Article is devoted to showing that study of the
routine operation of criminal-justice institutions belies the claim that
the American system unjustly shields individual corporate offenders,
15
that is, persons who commit financial crimes in business firms.
Privilege cannot be found in sentencing law and practice, which
nowadays treat the corporate offender with genuine harshness. Nor in
substantive law, which turns out to be more problematic for the
financial criminal than for many other offenders. Nor in the laws of
evidence and procedure, which do not produce an identifiable
advantage in case outcomes for the white collar defendant. Nor in
contemporary enforcement regimes, which—though they direct fewer
conventional policing resources to the corporate sector—have
structural features that heighten the exposure of business actors to
criminal sanctions. Clear privilege can be found in access to well-

13. For empirical examination of the contemporary scope of corporate criminal
prosecutions and defense practice, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (discussing the rise in federal prosecution of
organizations); Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of
Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221 (2011)
(discussing the growth of white collar practice in law firms and the demographics of
practitioners in these firms).
14. See, e.g., ANITA RAGHAVAN, THE BILLIONAIRE’S APPRENTICE: THE RISE OF THE
INDIAN-AMERICAN ELITE AND THE FALL OF THE GALLEON HEDGE FUND (2013).
15. There is no claim here with regard to firms. Many public discussions of these issues
have engaged in a category mistake by mixing arguments about the prosecution of individuals
with arguments about the prosecution of firms. See generally, e.g., Finkle, supra note 1;
Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1. The two regulatory and public policy issues have
important connections but yield quite different analyses. Compare Jennifer Arlen & Reineer
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (using economic analysis to assess the optimal legal structures for
imposing liability on firms to deter individual law violations), and Samuel W. Buell, The
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006) [hereinafter Buell, The
Blaming Function] (discussing the social meaning of imposing liability on firms and its
potentially beneficial message effects), with Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the
Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007) [hereinafter Buell, Criminal Procedure] (examining how
rules of criminal procedure and evidence apply when individuals are prosecuted within the
context of business firms), and Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971
(2006) [hereinafter Buell, Novel Fraud] (discussing how theories and doctrine of criminal fraud
should be understood, as applied to individuals in contemporary business cases). These sources
also cite helpful background literature.
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funded counsel. But there, the advantage is not as decisive as
generally believed.
The secondary objective is to argue that, in light of this Article’s
primary analysis, those who would cast the corporate offender as
privileged must question foundational features of American law and
legal systems that mainstream academic discussion usually treats as
sacrosanct. Given the increasing severity of sentencing laws governing
financial crime over the last twenty years, these critics would need to
argue for such things as routine imposition of maximal terms of
imprisonment for nonviolent crimes. The argument would also need
to consider abandoning Anglo-American principles of substantive
criminal law holding that serious property crimes, as well as theories
of accomplice and conspiratorial liability, require purposeful states of
mind; discarding constitutional and other commitments to laws of
evidence and procedure that are trans-substantive; reordering the
relationship between the state and firms to include surveillance and
policing practices that have not existed in markets other than those
subject to complete prohibition; and altering basic rights, including
constitutional rights, to private and public funding of lawyers.
Perhaps economic and social circumstances have reached a point
at which radical change is required in white collar justice. If so, critics
of the treatment of corporate offenders might do well to take up such
an argument. But advocates of such positions need appreciate not just
the ambitions of their agenda but also its possible consequences. A
desire to compel the criminal-justice system to consume a wider swath
of business cases might be a “nothing else works” resort to
criminalization, propelled by painfully understandable exasperation
with repeated failures of ex ante regulatory control in financial
markets. If so, the argument would turn out to stretch conventional
theories of crime. And it would be liable to criticisms that have been
leveled at reliance on criminalization to deal with, for example,
America’s addiction epidemic or its problem of immigration control.
Three prefatory points before proceeding with the argument.
First, the lion’s share of recent discussion about white collar crime has
concerned the corporate offender—the law violator who is employed
by the sizable business firm (incorporated or not), which serves as the
site of conduct that is said to warrant legal sanction. Many white
collar offenses, maybe even most of them, are committed by
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pedestrian hucksters, scam artists, cheaters, and liars. Such persons
have been among us for ages. This Article makes few claims about
the treatment of this class of offenders—the home buyer who lies to
obtain a mortgage, the taxpayer who cheats the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), the restaurant manager who bribes the health
inspector, and their ilk.
The discussion here responds to a public debate that does not
often mention the small-time crook. Citizens of the early twenty-first
century keenly appreciate how large private institutions and markets
17
influence so many aspects of human life. When people talk these
days about “corporate crime,” “the corporate criminal,” or “white
collar criminals,” usually they are talking about people who staff such
institutions. The subject of this Article is therefore the employee of
the sizeable business firm who is potentially subject to criminal
18
punishment for conduct relating to her job. Nonetheless, the term
white collar crime remains ubiquitous in this Article as elsewhere
because it pervades public discourse and, for lawyers, it references the
legal concepts, statutes, and doctrines that govern the field of
corporate crime.
Second, assertions about privilege are, of course, assertions
about equality. To say that law and legal institutions privilege the
white collar offender is to posit an elevated position relative to other
offenders. In comparing classes of criminal offenders, one runs into
normative thickets such as deciding, for example, whether mass
manufacture and sale of methamphetamine cause more or less social
harm than the draining of large numbers of retirement accounts. The
objective here is not to argue the case for or against any particular
comparative advantage in the legal system—or to address any of the

16. See generally John Braithwaite, Crime and the Average American, 27 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 215 (1993).
17. It has long been understood, and continues to be appreciated with greater
sophistication, that institutional context—particularly that of corporations and other business
firms—has strong explanatory power with respect to the commission of white collar offenses
and plays an essential role in the detection and control of such offenses. See WEISBURD ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 93, 177; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 695–99; Buell, The Blaming
Function, supra note 15, at 491–506; Stanton Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The
Organization as Weapon in White Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403, 1422–26 (1982).
18. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & RICHARD QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS:
A TYPOLOGY 188–89 (2d ed. 1973) (distinguishing white collar crime from corporate crime and
defining corporate crimes as those committed for the corporation’s purposes by corporate
officials and the corporation itself).
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many critical questions about the American treatment of drugs, guns,
violence, and immigration.
To the extent reference to the “street” offender will facilitate the
discussion that follows, that shorthand is meant to represent the
typical case of a nonwealthy violator charged with an offense
involving violence, drugs, or weapons committed more or less apart
from the workplace. Because most corporate crime is pursued in
19
federal court, the most direct reference point is treatment of the
street criminal in federal court. Though this obviously excludes the
20
great majority of criminal offenders in the United States, it should
not affect the substance of this Article’s claims. Scholars of criminal
law do not assert that the federal law of crime and punishment is less
severe on the street criminal than are state regimes—at least once
21
offenders have been selected for prosecution.
Third and last, this Article makes many empirical claims but has
no pretensions to being a rigorous empirical study. A wide-angle view
of the criminal-justice system is needed to develop a better
understanding of the normative question posed here. At such
distance, the system is not amenable to quantitative modeling. It is
too complicated and the available data are beset by gaps and
omissions. Data are nonetheless presented as suggestive and useful,
and are supplied against the background of qualitative institutional
description. The claim is made now (and in the interests of brevity
will not be repeated) that empirical uncertainty—even large
uncertainty—should be no basis for scholarship to decline to lend a
clarifying voice to a noisy and important public debate. Many issues
discussed in the following pages beg for full empirical treatment and
the following discussion may help define such research questions.
19. I have been unable to locate data to establish this point. It is certainly true with respect
to the highest-profile cases. New York also actively prosecutes in the corporate realm. But the
only major individual defendant in a state prosecution in a corporate case who comes to mind
from the last decade or so is Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO of Tyco Corporation, who was
severely prosecuted by the Manhattan district attorney. See People v. Kozlowski, 898 N.E.2d
891, 894 (N.Y. 2008) (“After a nearly six-month trial, a jury convicted defendants of 12 counts of
first degree grand larceny, eight counts of first degree falsifying business records, one count of
fourth degree conspiracy and one Martin Act count of securities fraud.” (citations omitted)).
20. See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV.
1097, 1099–1100 (2013) (reporting that federal prisons held about 200,000 persons versus 1.4
million in state prisons).
21. Quite to the contrary. See, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization
of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 668–75 (1997) (“Notwithstanding some significant
exceptions, defendants typically fare considerably worse when prosecuted in federal court.”
(footnote omitted)).
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This Article examines five parts of the criminal process that
determine outcomes for offenders, proceeding from least to most
difficult in terms of the question of privilege. Part I looks at
sentencing. Part II addresses the scope of substantive crimes. Part III
deals with the law of procedure and evidence. Part IV discusses the
allocation of enforcement resources. Part V takes up the matter of
defense resources.
I. SENTENCING
White collar offenders used to receive notoriously lighter
22
sentences than street offenders in federal court. Probation,
community service, fines, and short terms of imprisonment followed
by early parole were commonplace. Such relatively lenient sentencing
was one of the major motivations for Congress to create the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, which in turn promulgated the Federal
23
Sentencing Guidelines. The seemingly unbridled subjectivity with
which judges sentenced white collar offenders created inter-offender,
inter-judge, and inter-district disparities that did not square with a

22. For discussions of the history of federal white collar sentencing since 1970, and the role
it has played in the creation and evolution of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see S. REP. NO.
98-225, at 91–92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274–75 (considering the use of
probation and concluding that in many cases “the heightened deterrent effect of incarceration”
was not given its due, “particularly in instances of major white collar crime”); Frank O.
Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the
Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That
Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 385–91 (2004) (discussing the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s adherence to and departure from its historical approach to sentencing for
economic crimes in crafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,
20–21 (1988) (discussing the compromises made in the creation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, including “the Commission’s decision to increase the severity of punishment for
white-collar crime”); Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1644–45 (2007) (criticizing excessively harsh increases in the length of
fraud sentences as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Daniel Richman, Federal White
Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55–
62 (2013) (discussing the rise and fall of sentence lengths under the guidelines in the context of
judicial discretion). A study of federal prosecutions in New York found that imprisonment was
not as rare a sanction in white collar cases as may have been believed in the late 1970s and early
1980s: 46.4 percent of white collar defendants received some prison time whereas 49.7 percent
of defendants who committed “[c]ommon [c]rimes” received some prison time. The mean
sentence length was 21.3 months for white collar defendants versus 25.1 months for “[c]ommon
[c]rime” defendants. WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 130–31.
23. S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 22, at 91–92.
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commitment to equality in punishment. As with much of the
sentencing-reform movement, there were also many who believed
that, equality aside, sentences for financial crimes had just been too
25
lenient for too long.
Things have come a long way since enactment of the guidelines
in 1987. As much as the first-generation statutes and guidelines
constrained judges from case-specific leniency, channeled more white
collar cases toward imprisonment, and abolished parole, later
legislation and amendments in the 1990s and early 2000s turned white
collar sentencing in federal court into a harsh business. Without
26
repeating what observers have documented elsewhere, one can see
the gravity of contemporary punishment in three ways.
First, look at how the present iteration of the guidelines
governing fraud work out for a prototypical corporate defendant. In a
public company accounting-fraud case, it is possible for an offender
with no prior record to find himself at a level on the guidelines that
27
requires a sentence of life imprisonment. Like all federal sentences,
this would mean life with no possibility of parole: a terminal prison
sentence. Potential life sentences for financial crimes, and those
carrying scores of years of imprisonment, primarily result from two
features. First, guidelines calculations in economic cases start with
total dollar loss to victims, which can be extremely high in cases
28
involving financial instruments traded in large liquid markets.
Second, the guidelines governing white collar cases have a dizzying
array of add-ons to an offender’s point total—for things ranging from
abuse of trust to “jeopardiz[ing] the safety and soundness of a
financial institution”—that end up applying commonly rather than
29
rarely in corporate fraud cases.

24. A high degree of subjectivity in sentencing, of course, did not mean that sentencing was
necessarily unprincipled. A famous deep-interview study of sentencing decisions by federal
judges in white collar cases showed that judges coalesced around a series of common
considerations, most of them unsurprising and uncontroversial. See generally STANTON
WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).
25. Bowman, supra note 22, at 385.
26. See supra note 22.
27. See Buell, supra note 22, at 1643–44.
28. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2012). I have calculated
the suggested sentencing range for a hypothetical white collar offender elsewhere. Buell, supra
note 22, at 1643–44.
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(15), 3B1.3.
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These “specific offense characteristics,” in the argot of federal
sentencing, have accreted over time, as Congress and the U.S.
Sentencing Commission (not to mention the public) have responded
to waves of market disruption by looking for ways to make
30
punishments more severe for corporate criminals. Although the
guidelines bear most of the responsibility for the potential for such
extremely long sentences, Congress has also raised the statutory
maxima for major federal offenses in the white collar realm, thereby
removing any real ceilings on punishment for complex corporate
cases, which almost always include multiple counts of charge and
31
conviction.
Second, look at recent sentencing reports from the field.
Particularly in the last several years, it has become common for a
federal district judge to impose a sentence of imprisonment on a
white collar offender that is measured in double-digit years, and not
infrequently in decades. An unscientific review of the biweekly White
Collar Crime Report, a reliable source published by Bloomberg BNA
that reports on notable developments in white collar cases, illustrates
that severe sentences have become normal. In an arbitrarily selected
eighteen-month period (January 10, 2011, to June 19, 2012),
Bloomberg BNA reported on 187 sentences of 60 months or more of
imprisonment imposed in federal white collar prosecutions. The mean
term of imprisonment in those 187 cases was 144 months; the median
was 108 months. An imprisonment term of ten years (120 months) or
32
more was imposed in 84 of the 187 sentences (45 percent). Dozens
and dozens of financial offenders are now being routinely sentenced
to serve a decade or more in prison. Even if Bloomberg BNA reports
only cases with greater notoriety, the numbers belie any assertion that
courts are reliably lenient on white collar defendants.
Some of these lengthy sentences are nonetheless substantially
below much longer ones dictated by the guidelines. The hedge fund
manager Raj Rajaratnam, for example, received an unprecedented
sentence of eleven years in prison for insider trading, although the
33
guidelines called for twenty years. It is important to remember that
30. Bowman, supra note 22, at 400–01.
31. Id. at 404–05.
32. A table of these cases, including the defendant’s name, the nature of the offense, the
date of sentence, the jurisdiction, the sentence of imprisonment, and the fine (when available) is
on file with the author.
33. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2012 WL 362031, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 31, 2012).
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these sentences do not come with any possibilities for reconsideration
or early release. Some federal judges have openly expressed shock
and alarm about nominal guidelines results in fraud cases that they
34
see as deeply irrational.
As best as can be determined, no literal sentence of life without
parole has been imposed in a corporate crime case. Given the age of
many corporate violators, however, the longest sentences are
effectively life sentences. There has been no serious call to authorize
the death penalty for white collar offenders. But if the absence of
death sentences and the scarcity of sentences of life without parole
distinguish the corporate offender from the street criminal, one
cannot argue that federal sentencing law and practice—which govern
most corporate violators—privilege the white collar criminal without
arguing for a reordering of longstanding arrangements around
35
proportionality in punishment.
Third, the recent severity of sentences in cases covered by media
such as Bloomberg BNA occurred against the background of a
substantial increase in average sentences for all types of white collar
offenders. U.S. Sentencing Commission data show major increases in
fraud sentences. In 1996, the mean sentence in all federal fraud cases
36
was 13.2 months imprisonment. Between 1996 and 2011, that mean
fraud sentence steadily rose through the mid- and high-teens into the
37
low twenties, reaching a high of 23.2 months in 2010. (The mean
34. See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 750–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(characterizing the guidelines-prescribed punishment as “draconian”); United States v. Adelson,
441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (criticizing “the utter travesty of justice that
sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic” as “patently absurd on
[its] face”); see also United States v. Ovid, No. 09-CR-216 (JG), 2010 WL 3940724, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010) (“[I]n some cases the fair sentence can drift quite far away from the
advisory range, which is, after all, but one of eight factors the sentencing judge must consider.”).
35. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW:
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008).
36. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 22 tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/1996/TAB-13.pdf.
37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_
and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table13.pdf. Many of the data files that make up the United States
Sentencing Commission’s Interactive Sourcebook are available on the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s website, see Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.
gov/Research_and_Statistics/Datafiles/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013), as are the Annual
Sourcebooks, see Annual Reports & Sourcebooks Archive, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/Archives.cfm
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
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fraud sentence in 2011 was 23.0 months. ) Meanwhile, the mean
federal sentence for all bribery prosecutions rose from 13.1 months to
39
19.0 months.
Perhaps surprisingly, federal sentences for violent and drug
crimes have declined. During the same years 1996 to 2011, the overall
40
mean federal criminal sentence fell from 50.7 to 43.0 months. The
mean federal robbery sentence dropped from 110.9 months to 83.0
months, and the mean sentence for drug trafficking declined from
82.8 months to 70.0 months (albeit with greater fluctuation from year
to year in these two categories than in the fraud and bribery
41
categories).
Federal robbery and drug cases are, generally speaking, serious
criminal cases. They represent large portions of the federal docket.
One might want to argue that a typical federal fraud case should be
punished the same as a typical federal drug case. Fair enough,
perhaps. But the data show that sentences in the two types of cases
have been moving in opposite directions.
Of course, narcotics enforcement in the United States remains
more punitive than white collar enforcement for the overall U.S.
population. In 2011, federal courts imposed three times as many drugtrafficking sentences as fraud sentences, and the mean sentence
length was three times greater in the drug cases than in the fraud

Preguidelines (pre-1987) sentence means for fraud cases were nominally lower. See,
e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1984, at 42 tbl.4.3 (1989) (reporting that the mean federal fraud sentence
in 1984 was 27.6 months); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1986, at 40 tbl.4.2 (1990) (reporting that the
mean federal fraud sentence in 1986 was 32.6 months); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 1982–93, at 17 tbl.17 (1996)
(reporting that the mean federal fraud sentence in 1982 was 28.3 months); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 1980–87, at 5 tbl.10 (1989)
(reporting that the mean federal fraud sentence in 1980 was 27.1 months). However, these
preguidelines sentences were imposed under a parole system at a time when federal prisoners
on average served about 60 percent of the time imposed at sentencing. WILLIAM J. SABOL &
JOHN MCGREADY, URBAN INST., TIME SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS, 1986–97,
at 1 (1999); see also id. at 5, 7 (reporting that, in 1986, the average time served for fraud was 16.9
months for sentenced offenders and 13.2 months for offenders released from prison).
38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.13,
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2011/sbtoc11.htm.
39. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 36, tbl.13, with U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 38, tbl.13.
40. See supra note 39.
41. See supra note 39.
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cases. But consider, for sake of contrast, the serious white collar
sentence next to the federal narcotics sentence. Many people
probably think drugs are nearly always punished more harshly than
white collar crime in the federal system. However, the 2011 mean
federal drug-trafficking sentence of 70 months was half the mean
sentence of 144 months imposed in the 187 Bloomberg BNA–
reported white collar sentences of 60 months or more examined
43
above.
For measuring the overall criminal-justice system, these two data
points are apples and oranges. The point is simply that anyone who
believes that the serious corporate offender is routinely allowed to
carry on with life after criminal conviction, whereas prison life is
reserved for the drug dealer and violent criminal, is under a
44
misapprehension.
Before moving on from sentencing, one should note something
45
else. In 2005, the Supreme Court declared in United States v. Booker
that Congress could not make the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
46
binding on judges without violating the Sixth Amendment. As the
Court has stressed in later decisions, sentencing judges not only may
but must treat the guidelines as only an advisory starting point in
47
imposing sentence. Why then do judges continue to impose severe

42. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 38, tbl.13.
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44. Unfortunately, the sentencing data cannot tell us a great deal about who these
offenders are: big fish versus little fish, rich versus middle class or poor, and other deeper
descriptions. The data do show that, as compared to federal drug defendants, federal fraud
defendants are less male, slightly less white, substantially older, and much more often college
educated. Compared to federal violent crime offenders, federal fraud defendants are much less
male, very slightly more white, substantially older, and much more often college educated. A
table summarizing this demographic information is on file with the Duke Law Journal. The
statistics reflect data maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics as part of its Compendium of
Justice Statistics Series, many of which reports are available online. See Publications &
Products: Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=4 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). The data tables for 2004 and 2006–2010
have not been published but were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are on file
with the Duke Law Journal. Average percentages were then calculated by adding the data from
each year between 2000 and 2010 and dividing by ten. (The data from 2005 were not used
because the bureau changed its calculation methods for that year.) Thanks to Charles
Weisselberg for urging this line of inquiry.
45. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
46. Id. at 226–27.
47. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (recognizing that sentences
may vary from the guidelines, especially where the individual case deviates from the
“heartland” of what the commission intended that the guidelines cover); Gall v. United States,
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sentences on corporate offenders, while at the same time the Justice
Department and even the U.S. Sentencing Commission have begun to
worry that the preguidelines dynamic of disparate sentencing is
48
creeping back into federal courtrooms?
There is not space here for treatment of the complex judicial,
legislative, and administrative politics of sentencing law. However,
consider two speculative points. First, if sentences are not veering
back to the “old days” of probation and community service for
corporate violators, maybe that is because today’s federal judges have
internalized the view that such crimes usually should be punished
with imprisonment. Second, if many sentences (even longer ones) are
now imposed in deviation from what the guidelines dictate, maybe

552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.
The Guidelines are not the only consideration, however.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
350 (2007) (“The sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases, may depart
[from the Guidelines].”).
48. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the
American Lawyer/National Law Journal Summit (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111115.html
(identifying
federal
sentencing
disparities, particularly in financial fraud cases as a “serious challenge[]” to sentencing policy).
According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, post-Booker white collar offenders received
sentences 9.7 percent lower than drug-trafficking offenders, whereas in the period immediately
prior to Booker, the disparity was not statistically significant. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 75 (2006);
Casey C. Kannenberg, From Booker to Gall: The Evolution of the Reasonableness Doctrine As
Applied to White-Collar Criminals and Sentencing Variances, 34 J. CORP. L. 349, 358–72 (2008)
(describing decisions of the federal courts of appeals since Booker that have approved a variety
of grounds for sentencing white collar offenders more leniently than provided for by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First
Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–34 (2010) (finding, in the examination of one district, significant
increases in sentence disparities from judge to judge in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Booker). See generally Federal Sentencing Options After Booker: Current State of
Federal Sentencing: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Feb. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2012021516/Hearing_Transcript_20120216.pdf. One federal judge has sharply questioned why the Justice
Department is complaining in public fora yet not challenging more white collar sentences on
appeal. United States v. Ovid, No. 09-CR-216 (JG), 2010 WL 3940724, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
1, 2010) (Gleeson, J.); see also United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (observing that one of the key reasons behind the introduction of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines was the disparity in sentencing between white collar and street crime); United States
v. Whitehead, 559 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J., dissenting) (“We should not, by
inaction and excessive deference, be inviting people to open up shop scamming law-abiding
individuals or corporations out of hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, and then
accepting that if on conviction they say that they are sorry, they need not serve any jail time.”);
United States v. Ruff, 535 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J., dissenting) (“To provide for
a mere slap on the wrist of those convicted of serious economic crimes, with no or virtually no
time imprisoned as punishment, strikes a blow to the integrity of our criminal justice system.”).
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that is not because judges favor leniency for white collar violators but
because the fraud guidelines have become so harsh that they are no
longer much help to the sensible jurist trying to punish rationally and
49
proportionately.
Among the harder questions in American criminal justice are
which sorts of white collar offenders should go to prison and whether
prison sentences in such cases ought commonly to exceed, for
example, five or even ten years. Some would argue that corporate
offenders, who are apt to be heavily invested in, and supported by,
economic and social structures such as jobs, houses, cars, bank
accounts, class networks, and families, have much more to lose when
punished criminally—and therefore can be deterred by, or will suffer
50
sufficient retribution through, short terms of imprisonment. Others
would say that a legal system that confers a leniency or mercy resting
51
on economic and social capital offends principles of equal justice.
However one comes out on these questions, federal law appears
not to have much interest in them, at least in significant corporate
52
cases. Present arrangements allow one to demonstrate the genuine

49. That problem is not unique to the white collar context, as the long struggle over the
treatment of crack cocaine in federal sentencing illustrates. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems
To Be the Hardest Word: The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 765, 789–91 (2011) (listing reasons why Congress reconsidered “the erroneous
100:1 powder-crack ratio”); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1283, 1305 (1995) (“Even while affirming the [crack] sentences, federal judges
repeatedly have condemned them . . . as excessive and unjust.”).
50. For example, consider the disagreement between the en banc majority and dissent in
United States v. Tomko. Compare Tomko, 562 F.3d at 575 (holding that the lower court did not
abuse discretion in sentencing), with id. at 586 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (arguing that “relying on a
hefty fine in lieu of imprisonment as a means to deter [the defendant] from future criminal
activity only reinforces the perception that wealthy defendants can buy their way out of a prison
sentence”). See also United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“With
[the defendant’s] reputation ruined by his conviction, it was extremely unlikely that he would
ever involve himself in future misconduct.”).
51. For example, examine the arguments advanced by the Government in United States v.
Rajaratnam. See Government’s Reply Sentencing Memorandum at 16–17, United States v.
Rajaratnam, No. S2 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2012 WL 362031 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012), 2011 WL
4021120 (“[G]iven [the defendant’s] background, privileges, resources, and position in society,
his crimes warrant a more severe . . . sentence of imprisonment.”).
52. Some would put the point both more strongly and more generally:
There is no point in discussing the abstractions and nuances of proportionality when
in some rough sense American punishment is so wildly disproportionate to crime,
whether we focus on crime and punishment in the collective sense or in regard to the
specific misconduct of individuals. . . . [W]e are long past the point of marginally
identifying bad acts to punish but instead use our penal laws to add new tranches of
offenders to a vast and self-reinforcing status.
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harshness of sentencing in this field without having to answer fraught
questions of proportionality in punishment between white collar and
street crimes. Sentences of twenty years and up, with no possibility
for parole, for offenders who are typically in midlife do not leave
much room for further increases, at least not without a theory of why
fraud should be punished like murder. One looking to establish the
privilege of the corporate violator must look elsewhere than
sentencing law and practice.
II. DEFINING CRIME
A. White Collar Offense Definition
Turning to how the law defines crimes, the potential white collar
defendant is in particular jeopardy in at least four ways.
First, white collar crimes typically take place in benign social
settings in which the only difference between crime and commerce
may be the defendant’s state of mind. For example, to commit fraud
is to do a usually innocuous act—such as to make a representation of
fact in a business transaction—with a prohibited state of mind,
namely, the specific intent to defraud the counterparty. To criminally
possess drugs or a firearm, or to victimize another through an
aggravated form of assault, is to engage in conduct that is facially—or,
if one prefers, presumptively—criminal, assuming that a basic mental
state like being aware of engaging in that conduct can be inferred, as
53
is typical, from the conduct itself. By contrast, a prosecution that
involves an actus reus that is usually benign, and therefore turns on
the unobservable phenomenon of mental state, can be more difficult
to anticipate, harder to defend against, and more likely to produce
error by the fact finder.
Mental states may be harder to observe than actions but they are
also easier to mistake. And when mistakes are made, they may be
more difficult to expose. “I wasn’t there” or “I didn’t do it” are not
typically winning arguments in white collar cases.
Second, white collar offenses sometimes turn on fine points
about degree of activity or harm that are not often pivotal with street

Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1237
(2012).
53. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 115–18 (1978) (discussing the
“pattern of manifest criminality” among crimes that are “objectively discernible at the time that
[they] occur[]”).
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crimes, at least not as to guilt. Though a certain amount of waste
emission is legal and necessary to the manufacture of industrial
products, exceeding a specified allowable amount can transform
54
permissible discharge into pollution and trigger criminal liability.
Any amount of killing, theft, or controlled-substance possession is
facially, or presumptively, criminal. The large number of federal
regulatory offenses, many of them fine-grained in definition, means
that a corporate actor may commit a crime by doing less than the
street offender and may find it harder to prevail against a determined
55
prosecutor.
Third, white collar offenses are often both vaguer and broader
than their street crime cousins. It is much less clear what it means to
56
“devise a scheme or artifice to defraud” another, or convey
57
something of value to an official that counts as a bribe, or engage in
58
a borderline form of coercion that constitutes extortion, than what it
means to break and enter a dwelling house with intent to commit a
59
felony therein or “possess heroin with the intent to distribute.” A
statute that prohibits all false statements in matters of federal
60
government jurisdiction covers a massively larger realm of behavior
61
than one that bans possession of firearms by convicted felons. The
notoriously sprawling federal criminal code can be mined for dozens
of these comparative examples.
In the corporate realm, substantive-offense definitions cast a
longer shadow than they do over the street. That is true even if one
considers only the within-statute breadth of a few commonly

54. See, e.g., United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 239–40 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming the
defendant’s criminal conviction of violating effluent restrictions when a company’s discharges
were “double or triple the levels allowed by the permit”); see also United States v. Weitzenhoff,
35 F.3d 1275, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc)
(“We have now made felons of a large number of innocent people doing socially valuable
work.”).
55. For a more complete discussion of the criminalization of regulatory offenses, especially
in the environmental realm, see generally George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and
Other High Crimes: The Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1417 (2007).
56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
57. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
59. See 21 U.S.C. § 841.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
61. See id. § 922(g).
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prosecuted offenses, such as fraud and obstruction of justice. The
shadow grows much larger when one accounts for the well-known
proliferation, duplication, and overlap of white collar and regulatory
offenses in the federal criminal code, as well as the duplication of
many of those offenses in state criminal codes, some of which are
64
more actively enforced than before.
Fourth, when definitions of white collar crime do not turn on the
element of mental state, they often dispense with mens rea. The
federal code is famously full of strict-liability crimes (sometimes
termed “regulatory” or “public welfare” offenses), many of them
supplements to broader projects of the administrative state in areas
such as environmental protection, product safety, and control of
65
government ethics. These kinds of crimes, which have fewer and less

62. See Buell, Novel Fraud, supra note 15, at 1987–96 (“Expansion of fraud law . . . appears
to be a persistent and unavoidable feature of the liberal regulatory state.”).
63. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 678–79 (2006) (“[T]he non-coercive
obstruction provisions are . . . overbroad—leaving much to the discretion of prosecutors.”).
64. See John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation,
ENGAGE, Oct. 2004, at 23, 23–27 (2004) (estimating that the federal code contains over four
thousand criminal offenses and describing methodological problems involved in counting the
offenses); John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, LEGAL
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.), June 16, 2008, at 1 (reporting that Congress
has continued to add federal crimes at a rate of 56.5 per year and finding that there were over
4,450 federal crimes in 2007); Pamela Bucy, Jonathan Diesenhaus, Marc S. Raspanti, Holly
Chestnut, Katherine Merrell & Chad Vacarella, States, Statutes and Fraud: A Study of Emerging
State Efforts To Combat White Collar Crime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1535–36 (2010)
(discussing the increasing implementation of state laws mirroring the Federal False Claims Act);
Deborah L. Harris, Achieving Worker Safety Through Environmental Crimes Prosecutions, U.S.
ATT’YS BULL., July 2011, at 58, 59–62 (discussing the overlap between federal environmental
statutes and worker safety laws); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 703, 713–14 (2005) (“[O]vercriminalization is not merely a problem of too many
crimes . . . [but] encompasses a broad array of issues . . . .”); Roger J. Marzulla & Brett J.
Kappel, Nowhere To Run, Nowhere To Hide: Criminal Liability for Violations of Environmental
Statutes in the 1990s, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 204–06 (1991) (summarizing the expansion of
environmental criminal statutes); see also TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5–14 (1998)
(“Congressional activity making essentially local conduct a federal crime has accelerated
greatly, notably in areas in which existing state law already criminalizes the same conduct.”).
65. See BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. AND NAT’L ASS’N
OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL
INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW IX (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_
media/2010/pdf/WithoutIntent_lo-res.pdf (reporting a study finding that in the 109th Congress
(2005–2006), 446 new nonviolent criminal offenses were proposed, 57 percent of which “lacked
an adequate mens rea requirement”). This proliferation of strict-liability offenses in the white
collar arena has also been noted on the state level. See Aaron F. Kass, Note, Mindless Guilt:
Negative Aspects of State Environmental Prosecutions Using the Public Welfare Exception, 29
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demanding mental state requirements than definitions of more
traditional crimes, are easy to commit and can be hard to defend.
Other criminal offenders face arguably similar forms of offense:
immigration crimes, for example, are mostly status offenses and are
66
stuffing federal jails and prisons; or drug-possession offenses that, as
a practical matter, can criminalize large populations, especially
67
chemically dependent and mentally ill persons. But these still are not
strict-liability crimes in the legal sense. Perhaps outside the context of
68
sex crimes, where offense definitions have ballooned in recent years,

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 517, 536–41 (2005) (discussing the increasing
prosecution of environmental crimes as strict-liability offenses).
66. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32369, IMMIGRATION-RELATED
DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12 (2012) (reporting that the average U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement daily detention population increased by more than 50
percent, from 20,429 in 2001 to 32,953 in 2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND
COSTS 6–10, 34–37 (2011) (reporting that approximately three hundred thousand “criminal
aliens,” defined as noncitizens convicted of any crime including an immigration crime, were
housed in local, state, and federal prisons and jails in 2009, at a total annual cost of
approximately $1.6 billion); Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecutions, TRAC (June
12, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283 (reporting that criminal immigration
prosecutions had been on the rise since 2006 but peaked at 21,686 in February 2011, before
falling to 19,149 in March 2012); DHS-Immigration Ranks First in Terms of Share of All Federal
Criminal Convictions, TRAC (2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsshare.html
(reporting that the Department of Homeland Security accounted for a greater percentage of
federal criminal convictions than any other agency from 1999 to 2004, reaching almost 34
percent of convictions in 2004); Prosecutions for March 2013, TRAC (May 9, 2013),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/hsaa/monthlymar13/fil (reporting that over 50 percent of
all federal prosecutions in March 2012 were for immigration offenses).
67. See CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40732, FEDERAL DOMESTIC
ILLEGAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS: ARE THEY WORKING? 29 (2012) (reporting that,
between 1997 and 2007, there were more than 323,000 drug arrests and 258,204 convictions at
the federal level and that, in September 2008, inmates convicted on drug-related charges made
up over 50 percent of the federal prison population—with almost one hundred thousand
inmates in federal prisons on drug-related charges); Stephanie Hartwell, Triple Stigma: Persons
with Mental Illness and Substance Abuse Problems in the Criminal Justice System, 15 CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y REV. 84, 84–87 (2004) (describing and citing multiple studies estimating that as
many as 80 percent of incarcerated persons have histories of drug and alcohol abuse and that
approximately 16 percent of persons incarcerated in state prisons have mental illness); H.
Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons:
A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 483–85 (1998) (reporting that clinical studies
estimate that 10 to 15 percent of state inmates have severe mental illness).
68. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF.
L. REV. 885, 886–88 (1995) (identifying a “surge in popularity” of state sex-offender registration
laws); Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1076–81 (2012) (“Since the 1990s, registrationworthy sex offenses have grown dramatically in number and scope.”); Richard Tewksbury, Exile
at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42
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it is relatively rare for the common offender to confront felony
prosecution in a situation in which the criminal law takes a genuinely
no-fault approach to responsibility.
None of the foregoing should be surprising. Most major
corporate crimes are committed in economic settings in which it is
difficult for the law to draw boundaries. Trading securities to grow
retirement accounts is socially valuable; it is a felony to do so while
having in one’s mind material nonpublic information acquired in
breach of a duty. Seriously wrongful or highly undesirable conduct
can be embedded within activities that are not just permissible but
often beneficial and welcome. Line drawing is made harder by the
frequent lack of consensus, across contexts and among different
constituencies, about just which acts in ordinary business activities—
such as complex, innovative financing devices—should be deemed
sufficiently out of bounds to warrant criminal sanctions. As discussed
elsewhere, breadth and flexibility in substantive law are unavoidable
responses to modern economic wrongdoing, despite strains on
69
commitments to legality and fairness.
This description of substantive white collar criminal law as loose
and expansive is not controversial. White collar crimes have long
been prominent in the legion accounts of “overcriminalization” and
“overfederalization” supplied by academics and practitioners over the
70
last twenty years. With the exception of some notable Supreme
71
Court decisions affecting a small number of statutes, the expansion
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007) (“The past several years have seen a number of
increasingly severe restrictions imposed on criminal offenders . . . . The primary focus of these
efforts has been on sex offenders . . . .”).
69. See Buell, Novel Fraud, supra note 15, at 2018–21 (discussing how breadth in fraud law
is in part a result of the need to accommodate new forms of wrongdoing); Samuel W. Buell, The
Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1563–64 (2008) (examining how important
statutes and doctrine used to deal with sophisticated crime expand in response to innovations by
offenders).
70. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 8, at 234–38 (examining the increasing use of federal
criminal sanctions for law violations previously treated primarily through civil regulation);
Luna, supra note 64, at 709–10 (“[T]he federal government has assumed unlimited authority to
prosecute various forms of deception, with criminal statutes stretched to embrace gardenvariety dishonesty, promise-breaking, and breaches of fiduciary duty.”); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 525 (2001) (“[T]hrough the 1970s
and 1980s . . . [t]he areas of biggest [federal criminal law] expansion involved white-collar
crime . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005) (holding that
a statute relating to obstruction of justice via witness tampering requires “consciousness of
wrongdoing”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (holding that criminal
structuring of currency transactions requires awareness that structuring is prohibited by law);

BUELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

846

11/26/2013 10:30 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:823

of white collar crime definition comes not just from the legislative
process but also from routine statutory interpretation by federal
72
judges. Although this Article’s subject is individual justice, the
expansion of criminal liability for corporations themselves, especially
in terms of agency liability for their employees’ crimes, also has been
73
the subject of voluminous commentary and criticism.
B. Claims of Failure To Prosecute
How could some observers still perceive the substantive criminal
law to be insufficiently tough on the corporate offender? The
problem must be more fundamental than gaps, loopholes, or
oversights within and among statutes and judicial decisions. To the
practitioner on either side of a corporate criminal investigation, there
just do not seem to be many places left in federal law where a
prosecutor cannot find a legal theory on which to rest any strong
evidentiary case.
An answer might lie in considering recent complaints about a
dearth of criminal prosecutions for banking practices that led to the
2008 financial crisis. Banking activities said by critics to deserve
criminal prosecution typically involved alleged fraud in which clear
proof of any particular trader’s or executive’s knowledge of the falsity
or deceptiveness of the relevant statement or nondisclosure appeared
to be lacking—and in which the sophisticated (and sometimes
culpable) nature of counterparties muddied questions of deception
74
and intent to deceive. The most persuasive criticism in this vein, by

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 196 (1991) (holding that a conviction for willful taxevasion requires proof of the defendant’s “voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal
duty”).
72. See Buell, supra note 69, at 1526–55.
73. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 144–203 (Alon Harel & Keith N.
Hylton eds., 2012) (providing a full descriptive and normative assessment of the law and current
practice of corporate criminal liability).
74. An illustrative example is the purportedly evidentiary analysis, almost all of which is
conclusory, of “blatant criminality” in the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) industry by
Charles Ferguson, director of the Academy Award–winning documentary Inside Job. CHARLES
H. FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, AND
THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA 2, 186–207 (2012). A more informative and factual analysis is a
recent report on the extensive debates within the government about evidence and legal theories
involving Lehman Brothers, which ultimately concluded in a decision not to charge the bank’s
executives. See Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Inside the End of the U.S. Bid To Punish Lehman
Executives, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 8, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/
inside-the-end-of-the-u-s-bid-to-punish-lehman-executives.
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Professor Frank Partnoy, concedes that the substantive criminal
law—at least as interpreted, if not also as drafted—would have to be
relaxed, in response to pressure from novel prosecution theories, for
75
the relevant cases from the banking sector to succeed criminally.
Those questioning the Justice Department’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion have described a variety of cases as criminal
candidates: from accounting strategies used by Lehman Brothers to
improve its balance sheet toward the end of its days; to banks’
disregard of their underwriting standards in reviewing mortgages they
securitized; to institutions selling mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
while shorting the housing market in their own portfolios based on
76
expectations that the real-estate bubble would burst.
Some of these matters have been the subject of civil enforcement
77
actions and lawsuits. But nowhere has anyone described the
particular evidence that could be used in these cases to prove any
individual’s specific intent to defraud to the criminal standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor has anyone demonstrated how
to overcome defenses of good-faith reliance on purportedly adequate
disclosure to reviewing accountants and lawyers or to sophisticated
buyers of derivatives who were well-informed about the housing
market.
In considering theories of fraud in the MBS market, and the sort
of evidence needed to prove such theories, remember that—at least
in sophisticated markets for securities products that position a buyer
long and a seller short, or vice versa—each party by definition
78
believes the other is mistaken to execute the trade. That structural
75. Jeff Madrick & Frank Partnoy, Should Some Bankers Be Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Nov. 10, 2011, at 23, 25–26; Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s
Banks?, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2013, at 60, 70–71.
76. See, e.g., Investigating Fraud and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–4,
21–29 (2010) (statements of Sen. Kaufman) (describing “[a] bank [that] decides to relax its
official underwriting standards” in a discussion of “[c]riminals on Wall Street [that] must be held
to account”). See generally CONNAUGHTON, supra note 1, at 65–95.
77. E.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11 Civ. 6198 (DLC), 2012
WL 5494923, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012); In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 206,
212 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Complaint at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)), 2011 WL 4965843; Complaint at 1, People v. J.P.
Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 0451556-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 4479076.
78. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities
Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 330–43 (2011). That remains
true even when the short-selling trader chortles in a repellant way about the buyer’s choice to go
long on the product. See Jesse Eisinger, Financial Crisis Suit Suggests Bad Behavior at Morgan
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reality in trading markets makes fraud theories based on
nondisclosure exceedingly difficult to construct in the absence of
strong and well-defined fiduciary duties resting with those who went
79
short on MBS.
Perhaps a fictional example would help. Suppose oil production
finally starts to approach its limit as demand continues to increase.
Global prices for oil begin to rise for good. Tex owns lots of property
in North America with (expensively) reachable petroleum deposits.
Tex believes that prices will now rise so fast that a historic
breakthrough in energy technology will be forced, come to market
relatively soon, and cause oil prices to crash. Tex begins selling off his
properties. He packages different portfolios of property for buyers,
including ones that have only the deposits that will be the most
expensive to reach but that are also among the largest. Tex also buys
lots of derivative securities products that give him extensive short
positions on the value of petroleum deposits like those on his former
lands.
Rex, who runs an energy fund with numerous institutional and
individual investors, believes there is big money to be made in what
he sees as an irreversible spike in the oil market. Rex buys up Tex’s
land and purchases derivatives that give him extensive long positions
on the value of like properties. As oil prices keep rising, Rex keeps
buying, and borrowing to buy more. In the end, Tex is proved right. A
new, much-cheaper technology quickly hits the market and oil prices
plunge so fast that Rex is unable to liquidate much of his property or
Stanley, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/01/23/financial-crisis-lawsuit-suggests-bad-behavior-at-morgan-stanley. Unattractive trader
behavior and how it reveals incentives that require regulatory control are not new issues. See
FRANK PARTNOY, FIASCO: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 256–83 (1999)
(providing an entertaining insider account of the activities of currency derivatives traders at
major investment banks).
79. A different story might be a bank that originated MBS products while engaging in
practices of reviewing individual mortgages involving far less scrutiny than was represented to
buyers of the MBS. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has brought such
a case against Bank of America (as successor to Countrywide Financial), but it is a civil False
Claims Act case and no individuals have been charged. Complaint-In-Intervention of the
United States of America at 2, United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12
Civ. 1422 (JSR), 2012 WL 5974137 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012), 2012 WL 5235021. If there were
good evidence of intentional deceit about loan standards by individual bankers, it would seem
unlikely that the prosecutor would take the effort to bring this civil case but forgo a criminal
case. Unfortunately the civil complaint is not detailed enough to discern the quality of the
evidence of scienter. See also Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1 (interviewing former
due-diligence reviewers who reported that they were instructed not to use the word “fraud”
when describing problems with Countrywide mortgage loans that were not up to standards).
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unwind his derivative positions fast enough. Rex and his investors are
wiped out. Tex is rich.
80
Tex has not committed fraud. Nor has he committed insider
trading, which is a species of fraud. Rex is not guilty of fraud either,
as long as his clients, no matter how naïve they were, gave Rex the
authority to buy oil properties. Tex might be guilty of criminal fraud
if Rex had asked about new energy technologies before buying Tex’s
properties and Tex had falsely told Rex that Tex employed scientists
and engineers who assured him that nothing would be viable for
several decades. Or if Tex were also Rex’s realtor when Tex sold him
the land and Tex did not say anything about his views on the energy
market, his reasons for selling, or his means of selecting properties for
each portfolio.
These are the kind of facts a prosecutor needs to prove that a
market trade constituted criminal fraud when executed—no matter
how much an ex post perspective on the deal, or the market as a
whole, points in favor of much tougher ex ante regulation. And, of
course, even if the prosecutor solves the problem of constructing a
viable theory of fraud, cases often founder on the problem of
insufficient evidence to prove the theory beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Envision the cross-examination of the “victim” in an MBS case: the
derivatives trader from Bank B who bought the long position from
her counterpart trader at Bank A.)
Another refrain in criticism of recent prosecutorial strategies is
that Congress added a tough new substantive criminal law, as part of
81
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), that is said to be
tailor-made for holding corporate managers criminally responsible for
82
wrongdoing that occurs on their watches. The statutory scheme
requires a chief executive officer or chief financial officer of a public
company to certify that she has reviewed her company’s public
financial statements and that—to her knowledge—the filings are not
false or misleading, that the company has controls to ensure that
material information reaches her, and that any fraud or deficiency has
83
been disclosed to the company’s auditors and board of directors. A
80. For a more extensive analysis, see Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 32–33 (2010) (examining the problem of fraud in fiduciary
relationships).
81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
82. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street, supra note 1.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012).
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companion criminal provision imposes a sentence of up to ten years
on any executive who makes such a certification “knowing that the
periodic report . . . does not comport with all the [certification]
84
requirements.”
This offense did not much change criminal law. To convict a
corporate executive of fraud, it has always been necessary to prove
actual knowledge (or close to it) that material false or misleading
85
information was disseminated.
A criminal Sarbanes-Oxley
certification case, as it has been called, would require the very same
proof of mental state. The new offense is not a sword with which
prosecutors can now slice through the complexity and layers of
hierarchy in corporate finance to imprison top managers for the
misdeeds of their underlings. At most, the new statutes marginally
enhance deterrence by reminding executives of their longstanding
obligation not to knowingly disseminate false information about a
company’s finances.
To “hold Wall Street criminally responsible” for marketing
derivative products that unleashed mayhem in 2007 and 2008 would
require, at the least, two sharp departures from the traditions and
86
architecture of Anglo-American criminal law. First, neglect and
disregard of risk would have to be sufficient bases to hold a person
criminally responsible, at pain of long imprisonment, for fraud—a
form of serious property crime. Conceptions of property crime have
expanded over centuries to include not just direct physical takings but
also takings by cheating, deception, and ever-novel forms of
87
craftiness. But it has never been the case that a person can be
convicted of a morally serious criminal intrusion on another’s
property interests without proof that the offender engaged in the

84. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1).
85. See generally Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 512, 526–61
(2011).
86. See, e.g., Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman)
(noting that something like the financial crisis “doesn’t happen if there isn’t something bad
going on,” and that for Goldman Sachs to have taken extensive short positions in the MBS
market while selling long positions “sounds like fraud to me”); id. (statement of attorney David
Boies) (noting that when “improper” things are done, you expect someone to go to jail).
87. See, e.g., 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 285–91 (1986) (discussing how the contours of property crime have evolved to prohibit
fraudulent conduct, trickery, false pretenses, and false promises); FLETCHER, supra note 53, at
90–113 (discussing—in the context of larceny and embezzlement—the evolution of the
definition of “takings” to include intrusions on others’ property rights achieved by trickery or
intimidation).
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conduct with the specific objective of transgressing the relevant
interests of the victim.
To be sure, the criminal law occasionally treats risk taking as a
grave matter. But it generally does so when life is at stake and social
justifications are lacking—as with the crazed actor who gins up a
game of Russian roulette while high on drugs, or the drunk who gets
behind the wheel and careens into a pedestrian. Setting aside the
appeal of applying colorful metaphors to Wall Street, moral desert is
just not the same for the drunk driver who snuffs out the life of a
complete stranger as it is for the trader who unloads a sketchy basket
of securities on a less savvy trader, even if the loser in the trade was
managing the assets of retail investors or pension funds. To equate
such cases, one has to open a discussion about reordering the
deontological structure of the criminal law.
Second, principles of derivative responsibility in criminal law
would have to be recast. The imposition of criminal liability for the
conduct of another—through theories of accomplice and
conspiratorial liability, or through special statutes designed to impose
such responsibility—typically requires proof that the defendant was
fully aware of the criminal nature of the primary actor’s conduct and
88
shared the purpose that the criminal effort succeed. Exceptions have
been crafted in which criminal liability can rest on a person’s
supervisory responsibility for another who engages in criminal
89
behavior—generally limited, by the way, to the corporate context.
But those exceptions have been approved only for certain kinds of
90
offenses carrying light penalties. To hold a bank executive
responsible for fraud on the basis of having looked the other way, or
behavior of that sort, while her traders built up a financial house of
88. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 440–46, 477–84 (5th ed.
2009); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 663–71, 712–21 (5th ed. 2010).
89. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (describing how courts have
consistently interpreted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “as holding criminally
accountable the persons whose failure to exercise the authority and supervisory responsibility
reposed in them by the business organization resulted in the violation complained of”); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (“[An] offense is committed [under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] . . . by all who do have such a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws . . . .”).
90. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–07 (1994) (explaining that “public
welfare offenses have been created by Congress, and recognized by [the Supreme Court], in
‘limited circumstances’” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978));
see also Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 56–71 (2012) (providing a detailed account of the limited
doctrines of “responsible corporate official” and “public welfare offense” liability).
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cards that was doomed to collapse would, again, require discussion
about revising principles of responsibility fundamental to criminal
91
law’s general part.
Some of the civil actions that have followed the 2008 financial
crisis supply evidence for the point that those displeased with the
enforcement landscape are actually disgruntled with basic principles
of law. Consider, for example, the attorney general of New York’s
suit against J.P. Morgan (as acquirer of Bear Stearns). This splashy
case of fraud in the packaging and sale of large quantities of MBS
during the terminal stages of the housing bubble looked like an
aggressive prosecutorial move to cast a net over a large representative
92
pattern of abusive conduct in securitization of the housing market.
But the attorney general’s complaint, while reciting facts styled as
constituting fraud, cited as legal authority New York’s exceptionally
93
broad Martin Act, which prohibits far more than fraud. And the
94
complaint did not invoke that statute’s criminal provisions. No
individuals were named as responsible in the J.P. Morgan complaint
and the state’s press release left the impression that proof of any
criminal violation of the Martin Act was lacking and would not be
95
forthcoming.
In the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) civil case
against Citibank for marketing a basket of MBS that it filled with
hand-picked losers, while simultaneously shorting the same products,
the SEC charged an individual Citi banker who assembled the deal

91. Professor Sanford Kadish stressed this point fifty years ago in his foundational article
on the use of criminal law in the economic sector. Kadish, supra note 8, at 430–31.
92. See Jean Eaglesham & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Sued on Mortgage Bonds, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at A1; Gretchen Morgenson, JPMorgan Unit Is Sued over Mortgage Pools,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at B1.
93. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–353 (McKinney 2012).
94. Complaint at 29, People v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 0451556-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
filed Oct. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 4479076.
95. Id. at 1; see also Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11 Civ. 6198
(DLC), 2012 WL 5494923, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012) (providing another example of a civil
case lacking individual defendants); Complaint, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)), 2011 WL 4965843 (same); Peter J.
Henning, In JPMorgan Suit, a Lack of New News, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:16
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/in-the-j-p-morgan-suit-a-lack-of-new-news (“The
decision to pursue civil charges . . . means that the state’s attorney general will not have to prove
fraudulent intent, only that the firm was negligent . . . . While easier to prove, that also indicates
that the evidence to prove fraud was not strong enough to bring more serious charges.”).
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96

with fraud. A jury acquitted him, on the civil burden of proof. The
jurors said they thought others at the bank might have been more
97
responsible. But, as the journalist James Stewart has explained in
some detail, however shaky Citi’s products were at the time its traders
sold them, the SEC’s case lacked clear evidence that Citi’s disclosures
to the sophisticated buyers—about how the mortgages were selected
and that the bank might take contrary positions in its own portfolio—
98
were negligent, much less intentionally fraudulent. This barrier
would be present no matter who might have been charged within the
organizational structure at Citi, including the firm itself.
One might say that major changes in the substantive law of white
collar crime would look less radical if seen in light of the long arc of
criminal law’s development. White collar crimes as we know them
formed no part of the old common law of crimes. The concept itself
was not introduced into legal discourse until the twentieth century.
But the definitions of the most serious white collar offenses involve
either broader conceptions of how preexisting harms can be inflicted
(for example, larceny evolved to fraud) or broader forms of harm
regarded as serious enough to warrant punishment (for example,
dumping substances harmful to public health, manipulating modern
bureaucracies through corruption, or marketing faulty medicines).
Although there has been an expansion of strict liability for lowpenalty regulatory offenses, the statutes and jurisprudence of white
collar criminal law’s most serious offenses have adhered to the
commitments of criminal law’s general part.
Maybe there is a case for making serious crimes out of
negligence, recklessness, or failure to supervise for those who control
the levers of financial institutions that have the potential to inflict
massive damage on average investors, employees, and citizens. As it

96. Complaint at 1–4, SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ.
7388(JSR)), 2011 WL 4965844 (charging Citi banker Brian Stoker with securities fraud for
“misrepresenting key deal terms” and “engaging in a course of business that operated as a fraud
upon investors”).
97. See Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-getsencouragement-from-jury-that-ruled-against-it (noting that the jurors wondered “‘why the
bank’s C.E.O. wasn’t on trial’”).
98. See James B. Stewart, Few Avenues for Justice in the Case Against Citi, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2011, at B1 (“[B]ad deals, even really bad deals like Citigroup’s, aren’t illegal. They’re
not criminal. They’re not inherently fraudulent. If Citigroup’s clients, all of them sophisticated
institutional investors, were foolish or careless enough to buy what Citigroup sold them, then
arguably they deserved their losses.”).
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happens, serious discussion is underway in the United Kingdom about
adopting a highly novel criminal offense, punishable by
imprisonment, of “reckless misconduct in the management of a
99
bank.”
Perhaps the economy has reached a stage of development that
requires rethinking of basic commitments about lines between
criminal and other forms of legal responsibility. (Not to mention that
other realms of behavior, such as drug consumption, may be subject
to debate about decriminalization in equal measure.) First, though,
one ought to appreciate the nature of a claim that present criminal
law privileges the corporate offender. At its root, it is a claim external
to existing structures—one that calls into question first principles of
legal ordering and that faces a much steeper slope of argument than
commonly believed.
III. PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
The law of criminal procedure and evidence does not afford a
clearly identifiable advantage to the corporate offender. To see this
point, it is necessary to set aside for the moment two factors
addressed in Parts IV and V of this Article. One can think of these as
potential selection effects bearing on the impact of procedural and
evidentiary law. First, the government’s extent and methods of
applying enforcement resources to the corporate offender (addressed
in Part IV) might affect the kind and frequency of legal claims that
arise and succeed in these prosecutions relative to others. Second, the
resources available for legal defense in corporate cases relative to
street crime prosecutions (addressed in Part V) might filter out claims
before litigation.
With those temporary caveats, the present contention is limited
but important. Progressing through the major stages of a contested
criminal prosecution—pretrial litigation, trial, and appeal—it is hard
to see how one could claim that American law typically affords
corporate actors charged with crimes a better chance of success than
others subject to prosecution. Maybe this assertion is not surprising
given that procedural and evidentiary laws are, in theory, rigorously
trans-substantive. Still, it is important to appreciate that any
99. HM TREASURY & DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS,
2013, Cm. 8661, at 47 (U.K.); PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS,
CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, 2013-4, H.C. 175-II, at 516 (U.K.).
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appearance of advantage to the white collar defendant does not
derive from formal procedure and evidence.
A. Pretrial Litigation
In federal criminal prosecutions, a defendant has but three ways
to defeat a case short of trial. One is to establish that the charges are
legally defective in some fundamental way—that they fail to state a
100
crime or that they are the product of a prosecutor’s exceptionally
101
grave misconduct. The second is to persuade the court to suppress
evidence that the government obtained in violation of a constitutional
102
protection or contrary to a legal privilege, such as the one
protecting attorney-client communications, and then to persuade the
government to abandon its case because the excluded evidence is
103
dispositive. The third avenue of pretrial defense, rejection of
charges by a grand jury, is so famously rare that it can be treated as
104
unimportant.
The first line of attack—dismissal of an indictment—infrequently
succeeds in any federal criminal case. Between 2005 and 2009, less
105
than 7 percent of federal felony cases were dismissed. One might
100. See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that an
indictment must “validly [state] the elements of [an] offense” to survive a pretrial motion to
dismiss); Indictments, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 279, 281–317 (2011) (explaining that
a defendant may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), bring a motion
to dismiss a legally defective indictment at any time).
101. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254–57 (1988) (explaining
that prosecutorial misconduct, when prejudicial to the defendant, is grounds for dismissal of an
indictment); Indictments, supra note 100, at 281–90 (“A defendant may move to dismiss an
indictment based on government misconduct, including vindictive prosecution, prosecutorial
misconduct in grand jury proceedings, or prosecutorial misconduct outside the indictment
process, though the conduct generally must be so outrageous that it violates ‘fundamental
fairness’ or is ‘shocking to the universal sense of justice.’” (footnotes omitted)).
102. See The Exclusionary Rule, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 208, 208–27 (2011)
(“Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendment may not be introduced at trial to prove a defendant’s guilt.” (footnotes omitted)).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing a
conviction because of the erroneous admission of testimony that was protected by the attorneyclient privilege); Government Intrusion into Attorney-Client Relationship, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN.
REV. CRIM. PROC. 557, 557–59 (2011) (“Once a defendant’s right to counsel has attached,
government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship violates the Sixth Amendment if the
defendant can show a realistic possibility that he or she was prejudiced by that intrusion.”).
104. See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (2004); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 274–76 (1995).
105. Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2005—Statistical Tables: Table 4.2, BUREAU
JUST. STAT. (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2005/tables/fjs05st402.cfm
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think dismissal claims have better chances on the margin in corporate
cases, given that greater complexity and fuzziness of substantive law
would leave more room for judicial discretion on the legal soundness
of a charge. Or one could see flexibility in substantive law cutting the
other way: leaving more room for novel prosecution theories and
making courts hesitant to prevent the government from trying its
case.
The data do not support either of these theories. Between 2005
and 2009, the dismissal rate for nonfraudulent property-crime cases (9
percent) was slightly greater than for fraudulent property-crime cases
106
(8 percent). The dismissal rates for violent crime and drug cases
were 7 percent, equal to the general rate of dismissal for federal
107
felony cases. The rarity of pretrial dismissals and the negligible
differences in rates of dismissals make doubtful any claim that white
collar defendants enjoy a particular advantage in persuading courts to
stop prosecutions short of trial.
The law of evidence suppression is even less likely to favor the
individual defendant in a corporate case—again, holding aside how
aggressively law enforcement authorities collect evidence in the first
place. Unfortunately, the federal courts have not reported data on
rates of grants and denials of suppression motions, overall or broken
108
out by offense type. It is well known that criminal procedure on the

[hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2005]; Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2006,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. 25 tbl.4.2 (May 1, 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/
fjs06st.pdf [hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2006]; Mark Motivans, Federal Justice
Statistics, 2007—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 20 tbl.4.2 (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2007/fjs07st.pdf [hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2007];
Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2008—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 18
tbl.4.2 (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf [hereinafter
Motivans, Statistical Tables 2008]; Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009—Statistical
Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 18 tbl.4.2 (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fjs09st.pdf [hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2009].
106. Motivans, Statistical Tables 2005, supra note 105; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2006, supra
note 105, at 25 tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2007, supra note 105, at 20 tbl.4.2; Motivans,
Statistical Tables 2008, supra note 105, at 18 tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2009, supra note
105, at 18 tbl.4.2.
107. Motivans, Statistical Tables 2005, supra note 105; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2006,
supra note 105, 25 at tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2007, supra note 105, at 20 tbl.4.2;
Motivans, Statistical Tables 2008, supra note 105, at 18 tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2009,
supra note 105, at 18 tbl.4.2.
108. Survey research based on responses from four hundred judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys indicated that a suppression motion was made in 7.34 percent of federal cases
and that suppression motions led to an acquittal or dismissal in 11.62 percent of those cases.
Stephen G. Valdes, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses,
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street is dominated by the seizure of physical evidence and the
eliciting of inculpatory statements—activities that have produced the
lion’s share of constitutional law governing the investigation of crime.
That body of doctrine, housed mostly in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, is hardly friendly territory for street crime defendants.
But the exclusionary rule survives and is enforced. When a street
crime defendant does succeed in a pretrial suppression motion, such
suppression often terminates the prosecution because of the
dispositive nature of a confession in a murder case or seized narcotics
109
in a drug prosecution.
Constitutional criminal procedure is a much different enterprise
110
for the corporate defendant. Physical evidence in such cases, which
consists of documentary records and hardly ever anything else, is
rarely seized. It is usually subpoenaed and often supplied to the
government voluntarily or through noncriminal regulatory channels.
The Fourth Amendment has long been held not to require a warrant
111
or probable cause for issuance of a subpoena for documents.
Suspects more frequently refuse to speak to investigators, usually
do not give uncounseled statements to the government when they do,
and often contract for forms of limited immunity before agreeing to
112
speak. In modern white collar practice, the important issues of

Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1711,
1728 (2005). Older but more comprehensive data based on court records of several Midwest
counties indicate that motions to suppress physical evidence were filed much more frequently in
drug cases (13 percent) and weapon cases (12 percent) than property offense cases (3 percent).
Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 594. These motions were successful 16.9 percent of the time and
only 22 percent of those making successful motions were convicted as compared with 89 percent
of those who were unsuccessful. Id. at 594–600.
109. See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 216–36 (describing how the attractiveness of low-cost
suppression motions in street crime cases can divert defense counsel from efforts to investigate
and contest ultimate guilt).
110. See generally Buell, Criminal Procedure, supra note 15 (describing some of the
structural differences between criminal procedure in street crime cases and in corporate cases).
111. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) (describing how the application of
the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas has been limited); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
376 (1911) (holding that “there is no unreasonable search and seizure [in violation of the Fourth
Amendment] when a writ, suitably specific and properly limited in its scope, calls for the
production of documents which . . . the party procuring its issuance is entitled to have
produced”).
112. See generally Karen Patton Seymour & Allison Caffarone, Defending Individuals in
Government Investigations, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS §§ 12:9–12:21 (Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman eds.,
2011).

BUELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

858

11/26/2013 10:30 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:823

criminal procedure tend to include conflict-of-interest matters
governed by the Sixth Amendment and ethical codes, strictures
involving secrecy and the Fifth Amendment in the grand jury context,
barriers erected by the attorney-client privilege and, once in a while,
the narrow Fifth Amendment protections that apply to compelled
113
production of documents.
A white collar defendant rarely succeeds in suppressing before
trial a pivotal item of proof, or even attempts to do so. Even when she
does win such a motion, suppression of some contested evidence is
unlikely to stop a case that is typically based on a mosaic of
documents and testimony rather than a pivotal admission or piece of
forensic proof. The smaller role for evidence suppression by courts
may be due to the structure of evidence gathering in white collar
cases: with fewer uncounseled interactions with law enforcement,
there are fewer items of evidence to attempt to suppress. There is
little reason to believe that corporate offenders benefit in any
particular way from the exclusionary rule.
B. Trial
Conventional wisdom holds that white collar trials, at least the
complex ones typical of the corporate context, are harder for the
government. They take longer. They are heavy on documents and
light on compelling eyewitnesses or decisive physical evidence. They
involve technical issues that can be difficult to understand. They are
dry. They turn on questions of intent that depend on inferences. And
114
they often lack a victim with a face and a voice, or any victim at all.
All of this can make it hard to hold a jury’s attention, achieve clear
jury comprehension, tell a compelling narrative to which jurors can

113. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales
Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary “No,” 45
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1237, 1292–95 (2008) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege is the only
effective legal tool remaining to resist evidence disclosure in corporate criminal cases, at least
for firms).
114. See Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White Collar
Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 863–66 (2009) (noting that because “[s]tandards for
criminality are vague, unsettled, and still developing,” there is a great deal of uncertainty
regarding the “exact contours of the illegality” of certain corporate activities); Edmund W.
Searby, Defending Complex Corporate Fraud Prosecutions, in WHITE COLLAR FRAUD
INVESTIGATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS, BUILDING A
DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND DEVELOPING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 27, 28 (2009) (noting that
there is generally a “question of whether a crime has even occurred” in white collar crime
cases).
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relate, and motivate a jury to convict if doubt creeps into the ample
spaces left for defense counsel by the sprawling and confusing aspects
115
of a “paper case.”
The white collar offender would appear to come to trial with
built-in advantages. The allegations against her lend themselves to
doubt because her conduct took place within a generally benign
business setting that provides ready fodder for “innocent”
116
explanations.
And she is likely to have socioeconomic
characteristics and a life history that, for many jurors, may dampen
the tendency to believe that the defendant, just because she was
117
charged with a serious crime, probably did something wrong. She
has no particular leg up when it comes to the legal rules governing
admission of evidence, competency and examination of witnesses,
jury argument, and the like. (Documents can be stubborn in the face
of cross-examination.) But she may more easily tap into sympathies
through the storytelling process that trial lawyers know is crucial to
win over a juror.

115. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
169–70 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of developing a persuasive courtroom narrative due
to the “heavy reliance on live testimony and advocacy” in the Anglo-American criminal trial
system); Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of
Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 150–63 (2012) (discussing the role of narratives
in jurors’ determinations about a defendant’s mens rea); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth,
and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 286–302 (2012) (discussing how narratives factor into jury
determinations and highlighting the distinctions of these narratives with respect to white collar
trials). Recent examples of white collar trials that appear to fit this profile include prosecutions
involving the broadband trading business of the Enron Corporation, see Yeager v. United
States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), United States v. Shelby, 447 F. Supp. 2d 750 (S.D. Tex. 2006),
United States v. Hirko, 447 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D. Tex. 2006), United States v. Yeager, 446 F.
Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Tex. 2006), MBS trading by Bear Stearns employees in New York, see
Zachary Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 2009, at A1, and charges of accounting fraud between executives of the AOL and
PurchasePro companies in Northern Virginia, see Carrie Johnson, 3 Acquitted in Lengthy AOL
Trial, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at D1. The SEC also lost a recent trial involving alleged fraud
in an MBS transaction by a Citibank trader, but the jury took the unusual step of asking the trial
judge to read aloud a note urging the government to continue to pursue fraud in the banking
industry. See Lattman, supra note 97.
116. Some have argued that there is evidence of reluctance among jurors to criminally
penalize morally ambiguous conduct. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating
Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. REV. 321, 335–36 (2006).
117. See William Alden & Azam Ahmed, A Conflicted Jury Finds Rajat Gupta Guilty, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (June 15, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/aconflicted-jury-finds-rajat-gupta-guilty (noting that some jurors considered “what he had done
professionally . . . [and] were hoping he would walk out of [the] courthouse”).

BUELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

860

11/26/2013 10:30 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:823

Another important trial factor is bail, a matter in which the white
118
collar offender typically has a big advantage. The American system
of pretrial detention is one of self-insurance. If a person can place
sufficient assets at risk to assure a judge that she is not likely to flee,
she makes bail. If she cannot, she does not. On the issue of flight risk,
assets are a double-edged sword for some white collar offenders who
have used their wealth to establish properties and other ties offshore.
But this concern can usually be overcome because one who can afford
an offshore home can usually post many times the value of such a
property in bail.
In addition, pretrial detention decisions in many jurisdictions rest
heavily on considerations of “danger to the community.” (In federal
court, such danger is statutorily presumed in all serious narcotics
119
cases. ) It might go without saying that danger in these legal regimes
does not mean risk that the defendant will defraud or mislead others
and is very rarely a basis to deny bail to a white collar defendant.
As any defense lawyer will explain, bail matters a great deal to a
120
defendant’s leverage and chances of prevailing in criminal litigation.
The logistics of jails and prisons make it extremely difficult to prepare
an effective trial defense when the defendant is in custody—especially
if represented by an overworked public defender or court-appointed
attorney who does not have enough hours in the day. All else equal,
denial of bail makes a trial victory less likely.

118. See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 113 (finding that white collar offenders were
more likely to receive bail than those who committed “[c]ommon [c]rimes” (1.7 percent of white
collar defendants were denied bail, as opposed to 19.9 percent in “[c]ommon [c]rimes”)); see
also Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720
(2002) (reporting the results of an experimental study in Baltimore showing that represented
persons were far more likely to achieve pretrial release). Justice Department data from 2003 to
2004 indicate that a much greater percentage of defendants charged with white collar offenses
were released on bail than those charged with other offenses. Defendants charged with
fraudulent property offenses were released 70 percent of the time, more than double the
percent released for all offenses (32.6 percent) and the percent released for violent crimes (27.4
percent). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 46 tbl.3.1 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cfjs04.pdf. Defendants charged with ordinary property offenses were released at a slightly
higher rate (71.9 percent) than their white collar counterparts. Id.
119. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)–(g) (2012). Some states have implemented similar regimes.
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-5.1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1(1)(c) (LexisNexis
2012).
120. See 1 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 1.02[2] (Irene H. Rosen, Michella A.
Zeppetello & Douglas L. Winston eds., 1992).
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More importantly, pretrial detention increases a defendant’s
incentives to accept a plea bargain. It is a nearly direct reduction in
negotiating power. As a case drags along before trial, each day a
defendant spends in jail is one less day of freedom to trade the
prosecutor for a sentence reduction or to weigh against taking a run
at acquittal. Time spent in pretrial detention is typically credited
against the sentence ultimately imposed. If one is facing, for example,
a likely sentence of four or five years in prison in the event of a trial
loss and has spent a year in jail awaiting trial, a plea bargain for a
sentence of eighteen or twenty-four months becomes nearly irrational
to reject, regardless of the merits of the prosecution.
The foregoing story about the trial prospects of the corporate
defendant runs into a surprising fact. In the federal system at least,
the acquittal rate in white collar trials is not significantly higher than
121
in other cases. This bears repeating. Among the small percentage of
federal criminal defendants who choose to contest a prosecution at
trial, white collar defendants do not enjoy a higher chance of acquittal
122
than others.
121. Between 2005 and 2010, the 0.62 percent acquittal rate in federal white collar cases
(embezzlement, fraud, and forgery) was close to the 0.54 percent acquittal rate across all federal
criminal prosecutions. Over the same period, 7.6 percent of federal white collar cases and 9.5
percent of all federal cases resulted in a disposition other than conviction. See ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31,
2005, at 81 tbl.D-4 (2006) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2005]; ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
DECEMBER 31, 2006, at 81 tbl.D-4 (2007) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES
2006]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2007, at 81 tbl.D-4 (2008) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE,
STATISTICAL TABLES 2007]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 82 tbl.D-4 (2009) [hereinafter ADMIN.
OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2008]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2009, at 82 tbl.D-4 (2010) [hereinafter
ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2009]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 83 tbl.D-4 (2011)
[hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2010]. These reports are available on the
United States Courts website. Statistical Tables Archive, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/StatisticalTables_Archive.aspx (last visited
Oct. 30, 2013).
One scholar, who assembled a more granular set of data reflecting acquittals by federal
statute charged, found that the highest acquittal rates at federal trials are in civil rights cases,
some types of assault and sexual abuse cases, and marijuana cases. The lowest rates are for cases
of failure to file a tax return and for using a firearm in a violent crime that results in death. Kyle
Graham, Crime, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1608–14 (2012).
122. An illustrative case is United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2011). The
opinion recounts an exceedingly complex, lengthy, nuanced, and vigorously contested trial
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Both this data and the wisdom on the ground that white collar
defendants have better trial chances deserve to be taken seriously.
The simplest way to reconcile them would be selection effects—
specifically what scholars often call in the litigation context the Priest123
Klein effect. On this account (discussed in Part IV), prosecutors
choose their white collar prosecutions in the shadow of trials that
appear hard and resource draining, for all of the reasons described
above and more.
When observers wonder why, in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, there has been a splashy wave of insider-trading prosecutions
but almost no prosecutions relating to deals involving MBS, they
often reach for elaborate speculation about government motives and
124
the influence of the banking industry. The simpler explanation is
that prosecutors bring cases they think they can win. And, of course,
the quality of defense advocacy (discussed in Part V) may exert
considerable pressure, since the prosecutor’s estimate of how difficult
the case will be to prove could turn on how skilled the defense is
likely to be in exploiting weak points in a messy and far-reaching case
about communications among dozens of people within a large
business organization.
An enduring obstacle to contemporary criminal-justice
scholarship—maybe the biggest one—is the lack of good data for
involving accounting fraud related to a “finite reinsurance” deal between the American
International Group and General Reinsurance Corporation. Id. at 267. The jury apparently
managed to understand the case in spite of the obscurity and subtlety of the criminal conduct,
returning convictions after four days of deliberations. Id. at 273. The defendants nonetheless
won grants of new trials on appeal, after the court painstakingly worked its way through a
myriad of issues involving evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and alleged prosecutorial
misconduct. Id. at 273–94. Almost every claim of error was rejected, but the court nonetheless
found reversible error in one ruling admitting a stock-price chart into evidence and a turn of
phrase in one jury instruction. Id. at 277. Reading the case produces both appreciation for how
profoundly different corporate prosecutions are from those involving street crime and
uncertainty about whether the corporate defendant, at bottom, faces better prospects than
others of prevailing at trial or on appeal.
123. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
124. See, e.g., Rich Kirchen, Senate Candidate Hovde: Jail Wall Street Execs, Extend Social
Security Age, MILWAUKEE BIZTALK (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
milwaukee/blog/2012/04/hovde-jail-wall-street-execs-extend.html (criticizing the Obama
administration’s Justice Department for not prosecuting Wall Street executives and accusing the
administration of going soft on Wall Street because of campaign contributions). See generally
Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, supra note 1 (pointing to the revolving door between the
SEC or Justice Department and white collar defense firms, as well as the large campaign
contributions made by banks, as reasons why bankers have not been prosecuted in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis).
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measuring and understanding prosecutors’ charging decisions,
especially in the federal system which grants extensive discretionary
power. One can only speculate that the white collar offender’s trial
advantage, if there is one, is cashed out well before trial—in the lower
likelihood of being charged due to the discretionary enforcer
perceiving the case as chancy. The salient comparative question might
be whether prosecutors are more risk averse in corporate charging,
not whether the evidentiary rules and trial procedures that actually
control what happens in courtrooms make white collar convictions
harder to secure. But more on this in Part V.
C. Appeal
Complexity and ambiguity in substantive criminal prohibitions
would seem to make the white collar offender’s chance of reversal on
appeal, or success on a later collateral attack, significantly higher than
those of the defendant appealing a conviction and sentence for a
routine street crime. It seems plausible that the white collar offender
would benefit from greater attention and sympathy from appellate
judges by virtue of her familiarity to them as a demographic matter,
and the comfort these judges are likely to have with her more skilled,
more frequently appearing advocate.
The data call these hypotheses into question. The overall
reversal rate for federal criminal appeals decided on the merits was
125
approximately 10 percent for the years 2002 through 2010. That
period included a year (2005) in which a change in sentencing law
caused an extraordinary number of reversals. Typical annual reversal
126
rates have been closer to 8 percent. Offense-specific reversal rates
do not vary greatly from that low average success rate: in 2010, the
reversal rate was about 9.1 percent for fraud cases, 8.0 percent for
“public order” cases (which include bribery, perjury, tax, and
regulatory offenses, among others), 9.9 percent for violent crime

125. This rate reflects data maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics as part of its
Compendium of Justice Statistics Series. See supra note 44. Data tables from the years 2002–
2004 are available online. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 84 tbl.6.4 (2004), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs02.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003, at 88 tbl.6.4 (2005), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs03.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 118,
at 86 tbl.6.4. The data tables from the years 2005–2010 have not been published but were
obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are on file with the author.
126. See supra note 125.
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cases, 6.0 percent for drug cases, 9.6 percent for weapons offenses,
127
and 7.8 percent for immigration offenses. Fraud reversal rates
fluctuated between 9 and 15 percent during the years 2002 through
2010, averaging to a 12.5 percent reversal rate over the whole
128
period.
Perhaps really well-financed corporate offenders in the most
sophisticated cases enjoy marginal advantages in the appellate
process over average fraud offenders. But it would be hard—and
perhaps impossible—to find signs of that in existing data because the
data do not include case-specific information. In any event, marginal
differences in the otherwise very low rates of success on appeal of
federal criminal defendants cannot be the source of any substantial
privileging of the white collar defendant by the criminal-justice
system.
To summarize, available data and ground-level knowledge about
the practice of federal criminal defense make it difficult to construct a
plausible hypothesis that trans-substantive regimes of procedural and
evidentiary law contain any mechanism of substantial advantage to
the corporate crime defendant.
IV. ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
As the national economy and its many markets have grown
larger and more complex—and the modern regulatory state has
expanded—the gulf between law as written and law as enforced has
never been more consequential or more difficult to study and
quantify. Some scholars have argued that, in the American criminaljustice system, decisions of executive-branch actors are not just the
most important input into outcomes but the only one of real
129
consequence. The laws of sentencing, procedure, evidence, and
substantive crime can be uninformative sources for assessing the
chances that an individual will be subject to investigation, charged
with a crime, or offered a particular disposition involving a plea and
sentence.
One therefore cannot evaluate the position of the corporate
offender without considering what might be called the market for
criminal enforcement—a market that derives many of its most
127. See supra note 125.
128. See supra note 125.
129. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–84 (2009).
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important inputs from dynamic political systems. An argument can be
mounted that current arrangements privilege the white collar
offender. But, as with substantive crime definition, a clear-eyed
understanding of enforcement practices should make one appreciate
that radical change would be necessary to place the typical corporate
actor in greater peril of criminal enforcement—rearrangements that
would lead to a new order in the relationship between government
and business. It should be equally appreciated that a call to rest the
project of corporate control more heavily upon the system of criminal
prosecution is open to general criticisms of the recent American
tendency to criminalize intractable regulatory problems.
A. Enforcement Systems
On the face of matters, three factors could make an observer
think that the street offender’s likelihood of arrest and prosecution is
much higher than the white collar offender’s: where crimes are
committed, how they are committed, and how many police patrol the
spaces in which they are committed. Street-level police officers vastly
outnumber investigators of fraud, regulatory, and like offenses in this
130
country. Street crimes are more often committed, after all, on the
street, where conduct is more likely to be visible to police and to
generate arrests, both because of location and, as discussed in Part II,
the clearer act-based nature of street crimes. White collar crimes are
committed indoors, with paper, on computers and the telephone, and
at remove from the surveillance and evidence-gathering tools of
everyday policing. If crime definitions, as in the corporate realm,

130. In 2008, state and local law-enforcement agencies employed over 461,000 police officers
and over 353,000 sheriffs but only 636 fraud investigators and 177 tax- or revenue-enforcement
officers. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2, 8 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/csllea08.pdf. In 2004, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection employed 28,200 officers.
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2004, at
6 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo04.pdf. In 2004, the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service employed 2,999 officers, the IRS employed 2,791 criminal investigators, and
the Environmental Protection Agency employed 209 investigators. Id. at 5–6. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employed 12,414 officers in 2004, but white collar crime is only
one of its investigative priorities. Id. at 6. After September 11, 2011, the number of FBI agents
devoted to white collar crime investigation dropped because of the diversion of agents to
terrorism matters, but the number has returned to a nearly pre-9/11 level of about two thousand
agents—with a higher portion of those agents than before devoted to larger, more complex
financial investigations. See Investigating Fraud and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12–
13 (2010) (testimony of FBI Assistant Director Kevin L. Perkins).
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depend only partially on loosely defined act requirements like
“defrauding” a person, these offenders naturally will be more difficult
to “catch in the act.” Finally, of course, outcomes are easily
observable: American jails and prisons are loaded with street
offenders and contain a relatively small number of white collar
131
criminals.
Two considerations complicate the question of whether the white
collar offender is subject to a much lower probability of detection and
prosecution than the street offender. First, base rates of white collar
132
crime are not known. The data on most street crimes, though not
without flaws, are ample and have been for many decades. The data
provide a fair idea of how many murders, robberies, and assaults
133
occur, year over year and city to city. Researchers might even be
able to derive reasonable estimates of rates of narcotics distribution
134
and use. Data supply no good idea, however, how much insider
trading or accounting fraud there is, how many pharmaceutical
companies are violating food and drug laws at any moment in time,
135
how much testimony is perjured, and so on. Popular beliefs about
131. Of the 1,365,800 prisoners under state jurisdiction in 2009, only 33,200 (2.4 percent)
were charged with fraud offenses. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 28–29 tbls.16B, 17B (2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. Of the 190,641 prisoners under federal jurisdiction
in 2010, only 8,063 (4.2 percent) were charged with fraud offenses. Id. at 30 tbl.18. Of the 83,946
federal criminal sentences imposed in 2010, 9.8 percent were for fraud and 3.6 percent were for
other white collar crimes. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 38, fig.A.
132. See generally CYNTHIA BARNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE MEASUREMENT OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) DATA (2000), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf
(discussing
the
methodological
problems involved in measuring rates of white collar crime using data-reporting systems
routinely used to measure crime rates).
133. According to FBI data, there were 14,612 murders, 354,396 robberies and 751,131
aggravated assaults in the United States in 2011. Crime in the U.S. 2011: Tables: Table 1, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-inthe-u.s.-2011/tables/table-1 (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
134. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 2010 an
estimated 1.5 million Americans age 12 or older were cocaine users and an estimated 359,000
Americans were dependent on heroin. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 11-4568, RESULTS FROM THE
2010 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 1,
72 (2011).
135. Feasible empirical methods are at best only suggestive. See generally Laura H. Beny &
H. Nejat Seyhun, Has Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United States? Evidence
from Takeovers 23 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-012,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103673 (finding that in
recent years stock prices have increased more before the announcement of tender offers than
they used to, and describing this as potential evidence of an increase in insider trading).
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the incidence of corporate crime are likely based primarily on
journalism that is not systematic and can be highly misleading.
Consider, for example, a recent headline on the front page of the New
York Times: “Madoff Aside, Financial Fraud Defies Policing,” under
which appeared an article consisting of a description of a single Ponzi
scheme in Los Angeles and one plaintiff-side attorney stating that
136
“financial scams continue to happen at an alarming rate.”
The only observable data for these offenses are the number and
visibility of prosecutions, which may have no value as a proxy for
rates of violation. Federal white collar prosecutions, measured
broadly to include all types of such offenses, fluctuated reasonably
moderately in a range between about eight thousand and ten
thousand cases annually in the years from 1992 to 2012, spanning
137
several presidential administrations.
One can only speculate that if something like an old-fashioned
patrol force walked the beat within America’s banks and other
corporations, a much higher rate of apprehension of white collar
offenders would result. Certainly deployment of more Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in the white collar field would
enhance the probability of detection, and therefore number of
convictions, at the margin. But the difference between several
hundred agents nationally and several hundred more is not going to
138
fundamentally alter the nature of white collar policing. The thought
Employee surveys are hard to place a great deal of weight upon. See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR.,
2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: WORKPLACE ETHICS IN TRANSITION 24 (2012),
available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes (finding that 4 percent of survey respondents were aware
of insider-trading activity); KPMG, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2008–2009 iii, 4, available at http://www.
financialexecutives.org/eweb/upload/chapter/Portland/KPMG%20Integrity%20Survey1.pdf
(finding, in a survey of approximately 5,000 respondents who worked in firms employing 200 or
more persons, that 13 percent of respondents who were employed in accounting and finance
functions were aware of “falsification” or “manipulation” of financial information).
136. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Madoff Aside, Financial Fraud Defies
Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at A1. See generally Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s
Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 397 (2006).
RECORDS
CLEARINGHOUSE,
WHITE
COLLAR
CRIME
137. TRANSACTIONAL
PROSECUTIONS FOR 2012 (2012) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For example, the total for
2011 was 10,162 cases, whereas the 2012 total is projected to be 8,485 cases. Id. The early 2000s
saw figures mostly in the low to mid-9,000s. Id. There was a dip to numbers in the low 8,000s
during the years 2005–2008. Id. It seems likely that such fluctuations would turn at least in part
on economic conditions and market disruptions.
138. See Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1 (interviewing an FBI official about
reduction in white collar investigative force when several hundred agents shifted to terrorism
matters after September 11, 2001).
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experiment is further complicated by the fact that white collar
offenses are not detected by traditional policing methods but rather
by complex surveillance systems that include everything from stock
market computers to regulatory filings to reporting in the Wall Street
Journal.
Second, consideration of policing in the white collar realm must
account for a large universe of enforcement that those who do not
specialize in this area tend to elide. Institutions of the American
administrative state heavily regulate most industries in which white
collar offenses are committed. The securities fraudster must contend
with the SEC, the polluter with the Environmental Protection
Agency, the pharmaceutical company with the Food and Drug
Administration, the hospital with the Department of Health and
Human Services, the tax cheat with the IRS, the arms dealer with the
Department of Defense, and so on. These agencies wield potent tools
like investigative staffs, subpoena power, inspection rights, debarment
authority, contract denying and awarding powers, access to
prosecutors to initiate criminal cases, elaborate civil-enforcement
mechanisms in which costly penalties can be imposed, and sometimes
even guns, badges, and vests. Advances in information technology
heighten the effects of mandatory reporting regimes and monitoring
programs in the regulatory realm.
Some observers of the administrative state argue, of course, that
regulatory regimes in numerous industries are far too weak to do
their jobs—understaffed, underfunded, undercut by members of
Congress who do not support their missions, captured by industry,
139
undermined by the campaign finance system, and so on. These
complaints address the effectiveness of these agencies in
accomplishing their primary missions: use of their civil regulatory
powers to intervene ex ante to prevent harms from occurring in the
first place. The point relevant to this Article is narrower. Whether or
not these agencies “do a good job” according to any account of what
regulatory agencies ought to do, their existence and activities
introduce a layer and type of monitoring into the world of corporate
activity that does not exist on the street and heightens exposure to
criminal enforcement.

139. See generally RINA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND
THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010).
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Moreover, legislative schemes empowering civil-enforcement
agencies frequently permit and incentivize private plaintiffs to bring
140
parallel causes of action that can force information disclosure. Some
of these legal frameworks protect and richly compensate corporate
141
whistleblowers who provide information about law violations.
Although street crime informants can be rewarded too, those rewards
usually take the form of reduced criminal charges for persons who are
142
themselves implicated in crime. Monetary rewards for information
about such crimes rarely involve the large sums that can be realized
143
through, for example, a qui tam action in a healthcare fraud case.
And then there is the business firm itself. The law of corporate
criminal liability in the United States notionally makes a firm
criminally liable—with potentially far-reaching consequences to its
ability to do business—whenever a single agent commits a crime
within the scope of employment and with the intent, even in small
144
part, to benefit the firm. In the shadow of this de jure regime, a de
facto regime of corporate criminal liability has developed that says
this: Corporations will be held criminally liable for the crimes of their
agents unless they ferret out wrongdoers, turn them and all relevant
evidence over to the government, and assist the government in the
successful pursuit of criminal investigation and then conviction of
those persons. If a firm does those things with sufficient zeal, it
generally will be spared prosecution and offered a quasi-civil
settlement in the form of a deferred prosecution or nonprosecution
145
agreement.
The culpable offender in the corporate context can feel not just
the full power of the Justice Department coming down on her. She

140. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (prohibiting securities fraud); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988) (describing the judicially implied private right of action for
securities fraud that violates 15 U.S.C. § 78j).
141. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (setting forth new
whistleblower incentive and protection provisions); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730
(providing for private actions); see also David Kocieniewski, Get Out of Jail Free? No, It’s
Better, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A1 (describing an award to the informant in a major taxevasion investigation involving U.S. taxpayers and Swiss banks).
142. See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009).
143. See generally ROBERT FABRIKANT, PAUL E. KALB, MARK D. HOPSON & PAMELA H.
BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 4.01A (2013).
144. De jure and de facto regimes of corporate criminal liability, and the relationship
between the two, are explained in Arlen, supra note 73, at 144, 144–203.
145. Id.
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can feel that power leveraged tenfold by her own employer’s ability
and motivation to clear the government’s path to her door. This is by
design. The theory is that fewer crimes will be committed in the
otherwise opaque corporate context if managers and employees go to
work every day in the shadow of a powerful public-private
enforcement partnership—an enforcement system that is, by the way,
arguably subject to far less regulation, constitutional and otherwise,
146
than the system that operates on the street.
The street offender confronts lots and lots of police officers
but—aside from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement—no specialized police forces, no major
considerations about how to deal with problems of parallel
proceedings, including civil litigation, and (except with immigration
offenses) no employer-sponsored policing program. Of course, the
average street offender would be unlikely to care about civil liability.
He lacks the assets, economic standing, and social position that
typically make civil enforcement matter to a person. His additional
problems—and they are serious and growing—come after conviction,
in the form of extensive collateral consequences of a felony record—
which also of course apply to convicted white collar offenders, who
can face additional collateral effects such as professional or industry
147
debarment.
Though the street offender often faces the criminal’s age-old
worry about accomplices and coconspirators who might seek credit
with the government by becoming informants, this dynamic hardly
approximates the relationship between corporation and employee.
Often a corporation’s best move, after all, is to do what street
criminals rarely will: tell the government about the crime before the
government knows about it. A recent example is the lenient
settlement that Barclays Bank earned from the government for being
146. See generally Bruce Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Corporate Internal
Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2013)
(explaining the realities behind corporate internal investigations); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled
Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (2007)
(suggesting that the application of a civil regulatory model to criminal cases creates distortions
because criminal prosecution involves individual liberty rather than mere financial sanctions).
147. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS pt. II (3d ed. 2004); see
UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT prefatory note at 1–4 (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2009) (discussing the legal and social consequences
of criminal convictions and the associated collateral effects).
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the first firm to turn over its trove of information about who among
its staff did what, and when they did it, in connection with the scandal
over reporting of the London Interbank Offered Rate (known as
148
LIBOR). Just reading the relatively terse settlement documents in
the Barclays matter makes fairly clear that individual prosecutions
are forthcoming.
The white collar offender of course enjoys much greater freedom
from the pervasive presence of cops on patrol who can routinely stop,
search, and arrest him. In office buildings, there is no harassment
149
through “stop and frisk” and misdemeanor arrests.
But the
corporate actor pays a steeper price than one might think in terms of
directing assets and attention to the problem of avoiding government
actions for law violations.
It is difficult to say which situation is the one of greater exposure
to prosecution, at least of the serious felony variety.
Demographically, the young man who grows up in an area beset by
drugs and guns (especially the young black man) is vastly more likely
to end up in prison than the young man who proceeds through a
university into the banking profession. It is less clear, though, that a
corporate offender who sets about a major fraud or violation of a
federal regulatory regime, and sustains that conduct over a period of
months or years, is less likely to be discovered than a man who sells
large amounts of illegal drugs for the same amount of time. Instincts
and the composition of prison populations say yes. But there is, at the
least, good reason to hesitate in guessing at the size of any disparity in
probability.
B. Political Economy of Enforcement
Conventional wisdom holds that much, if not most, of the
severity with which the American criminal-justice system treats the
street offender—in the proliferation and broadening of offense
148. See Letter from Denis McInerney, Chief, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Steven R. Peikin, David H. Braff, Jeffrey T. Scott & Matthew S. Fitzwater, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
337201271017335469822.pdf (requiring Barclays’s cooperation and acknowledgment of the facts
set forth in Appendix A of the letter).
149. See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City
Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM.
STAT. ASSOC. 813, 822 (2007) (presenting statistics indicating that there are disproportionately
high stop-and-frisk rates among racial minorities in New York City); Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1328–41 (2012) (noting that low profile misdemeanors,
which are unlikely to be litigated, are often more heavily dictated by police action).
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definitions, length of average sentences, frequency and extent of
mandatory minimum penalties, force of recidivism enhancements,
abolition of parole and early-release systems, heavy reliance on
imprisonment as a sanction, and harshness of prison conditions—is
explained by the street offender’s impotence in the political
150
economy. Cracking down on the street is politically profitable
because it is cheap and yields high returns. It might also approach
conventional wisdom to believe that the white collar offender is more
politically powerful than the street offender and, therefore, that the
corporate offender’s advantages in the legal system are easily
151
explainable as natural results of the political economy of crime.
In assessing such claims, one must again consider that the white
collar offender typically operates under a giant noncriminal
regulatory apparatus that does not exist in the world of the street
offender. In the street offender’s political economy, legislators,
enforcers, and judges (many of whom are elected) trade off the
benefits of “toughness on crime” against relatively few costs—
primarily budget constraints and (sometimes) internalized norms of
fairness, reasonableness, restraint, and the like. The white collar
offender’s political economy includes a similar toughness-versusconstraints tradeoff, but also a tradeoff, or at least large overlap,
between criminal and noncriminal regulation.
This complicated political story is not fully understood. In the
wake of each wave of failures in capital markets, there is strong
demand for punitive action on white collar crime. That demand is
tempered, at both the legislative and adjudication levels, by advocacy
efforts of the defense bar and corporate-lobbying organizations that
are almost nonexistent in the realm of street crime. But legislators
150. See Stuntz, supra note 70, at 552–53 (discussing the relationship between breadth in
substantive criminal law and the lack of interest group pressure to narrow offenses).
151. For example, the leading scholar of the political economy of federal criminal law
enforcement describes in a recent essay his “deep skepticism about the possibility of a stable
commitment to white collar enforcement” in the United States. Richman, supra note 22, at 64–
65. As he acknowledges, one’s view on the desirable level of enforcement depends inevitably on
empirical hunches, impossible to verify, about the prevalence of white collar offenses. Id.
Though the accounts of the corporate bar and corporate lobbies must be taken with a grain of
salt, given their incentives to make noise (and their resources to do so), they would disagree
with the assertion that there has not been, at least over the last two decades, heavy enforcement
of white collar offenses and related civil regulatory violations. See generally, e.g., Glen Donath,
Responding to Globalization and Stricter Enforcement in Today’s White Collar Climate, in
MANAGING WHITE COLLAR LEGAL ISSUES: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING CLIENT
EXPECTATIONS, CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF
RECENT CASES 71 (2012).
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and executive-branch officials profit politically when a Skilling or
Ebbers or Madoff or Rajaratnam is sentenced to a long term of
imprisonment in the wake of a financial scandal. Contemporary
politicians infamously capitalize on being tough on street crime but
they also like to be able to tell voters that they have been tough on
corporate criminals. A myriad of evidence for this point exists, from
the public statements of officials, to the repeated moves by Congress
to increase statutory penalties in response to market crises, to the
success of white collar prosecutors in ascending through state and
152
federal political office.
One might even argue that the symbiosis working against the
criminal offender can be more powerful in the case of the corporate
violator. It is not just mutually beneficial to legislators and executivebranch officials to be tough on corporate crime. It benefits firms too,
because the focus on ex post punishment directs discussion about
153
responses and remedies away from ex ante regulation. Accounts
focused on bad apples and wrongdoers crowd out ones about systemic
failure. Tough prosecution of individual miscreants strengthens the
argument for leniency against firms themselves and their many
“innocent” stakeholders. These approaches benefit large private
institutions determined to hold down costs of doing business. And the
perception of toughness benefits legislators, and executive-branch
rulemakers and enforcers, who prefer to avoid blame for failing to
prevent wrongdoing through regulation. It should not be surprising
that the Bush administration from 2001 to 2009 had a record of both
hostility to business regulation and aggressiveness in criminal
154
prosecution of senior executives of large corporations.

152. Rudolph Giuliani, former mayor of New York City and candidate for president, who
led a prosecutorial assault on insider trading in the 1980s, is the most prominent example.
Former New York Attorney General and Governor Eliot Spitzer, though following a more
checkered path, comes more recently to mind. Conservative Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa
has been perhaps the most notable example of an antiregulation member of Congress to urge
vigorous prosecution of corporate fraud. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley,
Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/HSBC-1213-12-letter-to-Holder-no-criminal-prosecutions.pdf. For accounts of congressional efforts to
increase criminal penalties for fraud, see supra note 22.
153. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH U. L.Q. 95, 115–17 (2004) (discussing the lower level of opposition by firms
to harsher criminal penalties).
154. Bush and Enron’s Collapse, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.economist.com/
node/938154; Mark Gongloff, Bush Seeks New Business Ethic: In Speech on Wall Street,
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Another constituency—the bar—benefits from corporate crime
enforcement. The corporate lawyer’s interests bear emphasis.
Professor Charles Weisselberg and co-author Su Li have rigorously
documented important facts that practitioners and students of
corporate criminal enforcement have known anecdotally for some
time: the size and profitability of corporate white collar defense
practices have exploded in the last twenty years at the largest national
155
law firms.
Former prosecutors and government lawyers now
dominate these practices. Big Law lawyers get a lot more work than
they used to defending firms and their executives in government
156
investigations and prosecutions. That work can be very lucrative.
The corporate defense bar is often in league with the corporate lobby
in arguing for reforms that would restrain prosecutorial and
enforcement practices. For example, these groups campaigned
successfully to limit the pressuring of firms to waive attorney-client
157
privilege in criminal investigations. But rarely have these groups
organized efforts to repeal serious criminal offenses or curtail
enforcement in particular areas.
The entrenchment of this field of practice is evidence of how
much potential criminal exposure now hangs over large firms. The
effect of white collar practice growth is also dynamic. Lawyers
working on both sides of these cases—and typically changing
employment from one side to the other—have incentives to generate
more cases as time goes on. To think that revolving-door effects in
the field of corporate criminal law would lead to the squelching of
meritorious prosecutions is simplistic. Without genuine prosecution
experience, there is little for the departing government lawyer to sell
to a private firm. Without prosecutions, there is nothing for the
President Wants Longer Jail Terms, Tougher Laws To Curb Corporate Abuses, CNNMONEY
(July 9, 2002, 4:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/09/news/bush.
155. See Weisselberg & Li, supra note 13, at 1291–92. Strikingly, the authors find a close
correlation between a firm’s ranking in the “Am Law 100” and the percentage of its partners
who hold themselves out as working in the area of white collar corporate defense. Id. at 1252–
53.
156. The Weisselberg and Li study has the industry-wide details, id. at 1263–72, but
sometimes a single case nearly makes the point. In 2008, when the Siemens Corporation settled
a massive criminal case involving Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, the company
represented that, so far, it had paid over 500 million Euros in fees combined to one law firm and
one auditing firm for responding to the investigation and prosecution. Press Release, Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, Investigation and Summary of Findings with Respect to the Proceedings in
Munich and the US 8 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/
2008-12-PK/summary-e.pdf.
157. O’Sullivan, supra note 113, at 1241–43.
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defense bar to sell to its clients. The economics and sociology of the
corporate crime bar are much more complex and merit a great deal
more study. But even on a simple and fairly cynical analysis, public
officials would lack motivation to shield corporate offenders from
prosecution.
Even less persuasive is the claim that enforcement bureaucracies
would protect corporate criminals because those individuals are large
donors to election campaigns. This claim rests on two assumptions
that are implausible to a reasonable observer, much less to anyone
who has worked in a significant executive-branch position: First, that
the value of any one person’s fundraising largesse would outweigh the
value of satisfying public demand for harsh punishment of high-level
corporate wrongdoers. And second, that it is the habit of presidential
political advisers to direct Justice Department officials about whom to
prosecute and the habit of department officials to respond to such
direction.
There is scant empirical evidence for such claims. President
George W. Bush’s political operation was far more successful than
President Barack Obama’s in raising money from the corporate
sector, whereas the Justice Department under Bush brought more
high-profile prosecutions of senior corporate executives than it has
158
under Obama. (Remember Ken Lay, the big contributor to Bush’s
campaigns?) One ought to be careful about asserting that the white
collar offender is plainly monitored, investigated, and prosecuted at
159
much lower probability or frequency than the street offender. At
the least, serious obstacles exist to comparing the expected sanction
of the two types of offender, especially at the level of reliable data.
One might approach the question of privilege in enforcement
from the angle of a thought experiment. What would things look like
if corporate actors faced a substantially higher chance of
apprehension and prosecution than at present? It would have to be a
state of affairs in which the government not only did more policing
than it does at present, through all of its elaborate regulatory
apparatuses, but in which the government treated the corporate actor
158. See supra notes 1, 3–4, 154 and accompanying text.
159. The authors of a treatise for practitioners in the field of corporate crime recently
concluded that there is “little doubt that we have reached a high water mark for government
investigations in which the risk of becoming swept up in such an investigation is greater than
ever before.” Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman, White Collar Landscape: Regulators,
Targets and Priorities, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 112, § 1:9.
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like it handles the drug dealer, alien smuggler, gunrunner, or loan
shark. To do this, corporate criminal enforcement would need to rely
on two staples of policing that account for a lot of volume in street
cases, especially federal ones, but that would seriously shake up the
business world.
First, a heavy and reliable flow of accomplice witnesses would
have to be produced through determined campaigns to arrest and
prosecute lots of people for lower-level offenses and offer them
sentencing relief in exchange for testimony. To be sure, many
important cases of corporate crime have been built through charges
that have led to guilty pleas of cooperating witnesses. But that is the
standard, work-up-the-ladder tactic in most criminal investigations. In
other realms of criminal activity, particularly organized crime and
drug trafficking, enforcers cast a much wider net, hauling in lots of
fish with the knowledge that a certain number will know something
significant about larger fish—even if the government often does not
know what.
How would that strategy work in, for example, the investment
banking world, in which the routine activities of traders are not
exactly the equivalent of hand-to-hand cocaine sales on a street
corner? It would not work, of course, short of a radical redefinition of
the legality of banking practices in the United States or, as a few have
proposed, a campaign to arrest all the drug users and prostitution
clients who happen to hold down jobs in the financial industry.
Second, the government would need to engage in the kind of
real-time monitoring of criminal activity that it deploys in
sophisticated organized crime, drug, and terrorism investigations.
Given the size and complexity of global financial markets, this would
require vastly larger regulatory systems employing thousands more
investigators, as well as funding public salaries that could seriously
compete with the private sector for top-echelon talent and expertise.
Even if such practical problems could be solved, Fourth Amendment
rights and other legal protections would often require the government
to have some evidence of criminal conduct in hand before it could
raid corporate office buildings and surveil email, telephone, and other
communications not already subject to regulatory monitoring
requirements.
The need for such evidence turns one back to the problem of
how to generate large numbers of informants and accomplice
witnesses in corporate cases. Criminal investigations that are covert
and contemporaneous with criminal activity are not unheard of in
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white collar crime. (The recent spate of Wall Street insider-trading
prosecutions provide examples.) But such cases remain exceptional.
They are difficult to envision in areas like accounting fraud or
deception in the trading of novel banking products—in which it is
very hard to know that a crime is afoot until things go sour and
unwind, and in which it is rare for the government to hear someone
blow the whistle without the press and everyone else hearing it at the
same time.
Recall the discussion of substantive crime definition in Part II.
By nature, sophisticated white collar offenses do not lend themselves
to proof through the kind of forensic evidence and stranger
eyewitness common with street crimes. Such prosecutions, even those
that include the rare smoking gun document, require witnesses who
are in a position to testify to facts that clearly establish the state of
mind of other persons.
At bottom, to argue that the corporate actor is privileged over
the street offender because law enforcement is less pervasive and
resourceful in her realm is, as with substantive crime definition, to call
into question matters of basic ordering that are prior to particular
disputes about enforcement bureaucracies and their strategies and
activities. When the corporate actor engages in crime, she does so in a
social setting in which she is embedded in activities that society has
chosen, at the basic level of capitalist economic structures, to treat as
not only legitimate but desirable. To make her conduct subject to
omnipresent policing would require profound redesign of the
relationship between the state and business firms. Such redesign
would need to go far beyond hiring larger staffs at the SEC and other
regulatory agencies.
One can argue that such change would, on balance, enhance
social welfare. But the argument should be recognized for what it is,
and not taken as a contention merely about skew in the priorities of
legislators and executive-branch officials explained by plain old
capture and inertia. Proponents of such positions should further be
prepared to answer an objection. Modern America’s tendency to
criminalize problems it finds hard to solve through other means has
160
provoked a rising chorus of critics. They say, first, that criminal law
is being hijacked from its proper social mission and, second, that mass
criminalization imposes crippling material and moral costs. The

160. See supra note 2.
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advocate for renovation of corporate crime enforcement has the
burden to either rebut this genre of argument or show it to be
inapposite to the field of business conduct.
V. DEFENSE RESOURCES
One could fairly answer this Article’s question by saying that of
course the corporate offender is privileged: she is richer and has more
social capital than the typical individual charged with a street crime.
True as that statement may be, it is a demographic point that does not
speak directly to arrangements in law and legal institutions. Maybe
the question could be reframed this way: Does the corporate
offender’s wealth advantage cash out to better treatment by the law
and institutions of criminal enforcement? Even this question is a bit
too simple. No one could dispute that a defendant who has millions to
spend on an attorney is better off, on average and all else equal, than
one who has to rely on a minimalist, state-funded defense.
Even in street crime cases of the highest stakes, the pattern of
seriously below-standard performance by appointed defense counsel
161
(and, less often, public defenders) is notorious and demoralizing.
Further troubling is a fact lost on many who do not study crime in the

161. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make?: The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes 17–19 (2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/
RAND_WR870.pdf (finding, in an empirical study of random attorney assignment for indigent
defendants in Philadelphia, that representation by a professionalized public defender office
versus a low-paid court-appointed counsel made conviction 19 percent less likely, life sentence
62 percent less likely, and prison term 24 percent shorter); see also David S. Abrams & Albert
H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment To Investigate Attorney
Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1167–69 (2007) (finding that, when controlling for several
important variables, years of experience of an assigned public defender correlated with lower
sentence outcomes for defendants); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1835–39 (1994)
(describing incompetence by appointed attorneys in death penalty cases, including a case in
which a woman received the death penalty for arranging to have her abusive, adulterous
husband killed after counsel failed to submit basic evidence and arrived at court drunk); Floyd
Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does
Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 407–12 (1991) (concluding
from a review of many studies that the category of defense counsel does not matter to outcome,
but observing that there is wide variation in quality of counsel within categories and that
wealthy defendants are likely to enjoy better outcomes); Talia Nye-Keif, “Capital” Punishment
or “Lack-of-Capital” Punishment? Indigent Death Penalty Defendants Are Penalized by a
Procedurally Flawed Counsel Appointment Process, 10 SCHOLAR 211, 214–16 (2008) (describing
several horror stories of incompetent-attorney representation leading to death penalty
convictions, including use of passages of argument copied and pasted from previous cases).

BUELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

WHITE COLLAR PRIVILEGE

11/26/2013 10:30 AM

879

corporate sector. It is not just that the poor or working-class
defendant in many jurisdictions has no access to a good lawyer
because she lacks the savings to pay for one. Many employees of large
firms who violate the law on the job have something most Americans
can only dream of: legal insurance. It is standard practice—and in
many instances statutorily or contractually guaranteed—for firms to
indemnify employees for legal-defense costs, or at least to advance
those costs, after which “clawback” efforts are rarely pursued in the
162
event of criminal conviction. A federal appellate court has even
ruled that a corporate employee’s access to such funding enjoys, in
some circumstances, constitutional protection under the Sixth
163
Amendment.
Moving beyond the plain fact of resource disparity, the question
of interest to this Article can be put more precisely: How exactly
might the corporate offender leverage her wealth advantage into a
better chance of escaping criminal sanction, and how might one
estimate the quantity of advantage she enjoys at that point of
leverage? The answers lie in a place that is surprising but also natural:
bargaining over charging and pleas.
A. Trial
Start with trial, the place casual observers think of as the point of
maximum wealth advantage. The popular image is the contrast
between the overworked, woefully compensated appointed lawyer in
the rural South and the Darrow-like wizard of cross-examination who
is the most expensive hired gun in a big city jurisdiction. Anyone who
follows notable cases in the media can conjure without effort many
recent prosecutions that supply this imagery.
162. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 42–76 (2010) (describing the
scope, extent, and pervasiveness of corporations’ insurance coverage of directors and officers
for liability and defense costs associated with law violations on the job); Buell, Criminal
Procedure, supra note 15, at 1650–55, 1658 (discussing how corporate insurance and
indemnification cover individual legal-defense costs); Peter Lattman, Stuck with a Defense Tab,
and Awaiting a Payback, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2012, at B1 (reporting that Goldman Sachs was
legally required to advance the estimated $30 million in costs of the criminal defense of a former
member of its board of directors convicted of insider trading for leaking proprietary information
about board discussions, and that the company could not even begin to seek repayment until
after resolution of the appeal of conviction); Gretchen Morgenson, Legal Fees Mount at Fannie
and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at B1 (reporting that almost $50 million had been
advanced over a three-year period to defend executives of troubled mortgage giants in
regulatory actions and lawsuits).
163. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
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But one should hesitate before concluding that such stereotypes
represent the typical experience of the criminal defendant in a
corporate case. There are abundant contrasting examples. The
defense of Jeffrey Skilling, the former CEO of Enron, which was
164
reported to have cost over $70 million in defense funds, resulted in a
sentence of nearly twenty years in prison, which was ultimately
reduced to fourteen years under an agreement to forgo collateral
165
attack. Raj Rajaratnam, the former hedge fund chief convicted in a
historically large insider-trading case, may have spent over $40
166
million for a sentence of eleven years in prison. Allen Stanford, who
ran a large bank that turned out to include a massive Ponzi scheme,
churned through multiple teams of attorneys, private and appointed,
who spent several years litigating an elaborate and multifaceted
defense that nevertheless resulted in a sentence of 110 years in
167
prison.
Then there is the overall data. In 2010 for example, the acquittal
rate in federal trials of securities fraud, bank fraud, and mail fraud
164. Christopher Palmeri, The Sky-High Cost of Skilling’s Defense, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-10-19/the-sky-highcost-of-skillings-defensebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (noting
that Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling spent almost $70 million on their defenses).
165. Tom Fowler, Former Enron CEO Sentence Cut to 14 Years, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2013,
at A3.
166. Michael Rothfeld & Chad Bray, Loss Raises Question over Defense Strategy, WALL ST.
J. (May 12, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870468190457
6319673566636108. The defense team for Rajat Gupta, a Goldman Sachs board member
charged for supplying tips to Rajaratnam, reportedly cost $30 million, with most of that bill
being advanced by Goldman Sachs. Lattman, supra note 162. Other examples of very high
defense bills for white collar defendants include Sanjay Kumar of Computer Associates ($14.9
million), Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco ($17.7 million and $8 million for each of two trials), Kirk
Shelton of Cendant ($24 million), the Rigases of Adelphia ($25 million), and Richard Scrushy of
HealthSouth ($32 million). Peter Lattman, Happy Anniversary DOJ! Love, Judge Kaplan,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 17, 2007, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/07/17/happyanniversary-love-judge-kaplan.
167. See Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Andrew M. Harris, Allen Stanford Loses Bid for $100
Million of Lloyd’s Director’s Insurance, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/allen-stanford-loses-bid-for-100-million-of-lloyd-s-directorsinsurance.html (reporting that Allen Stanford lost access to legal insurance after a judge found
that he had violated terms of the insurance contract); Amir Efrati, How Many Lawyers Does It
Take To Defend Allen Stanford?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 7, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2010/06/07/how-many-lawyers-does-it-take-to-defend-allen-stanford (noting that 120
lawyers, paralegals and clerks from 10 different law firms worked as part of Stanford’s defense
team); see also Mary Flood, Pay the Lawyers, Judge Says, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2010, at D1
(describing litigation over whether Lloyd’s was required under an insurance policy to pay
defense fees for Stanford); Clifford Krauss, Financier Is Sentenced to 110 Years for Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2012, at B1 (discussing reactions to the sentencing of Stanford).
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was nearly the same as it was for all federal criminal trials combined,
168
a category dominated by immigration and drug prosecutions. This
169
has been true of the data for many years. In the cases that go to trial
in federal court, juries are not more likely to acquit the defendants
with the hired-gun lawyers (assuming, as seems more than
reasonable, that a significantly higher percentage of white collar
defendants than street crime offenders are represented by retained
counsel). Moreover, criminal trials are notoriously rare in federal
170
court as a general matter.
B. Plea Bargaining
To find the point of leverage from advantage in funding of
counsel, one therefore must consider selection effects. If expensive
lawyers do not produce significantly higher rates of acquittal, perhaps
they make it less likely that a client will be charged with a crime. Or
maybe they make it more likely that a client will be offered a
favorable plea bargain that will make trial a less attractive alternative
than it tends to be for the street crime defendant. In other words,
maybe white collar cases that go to trial produce roughly the same

168. In 2010, the overall nonconviction rate was 6.5 percent and the nonconviction rate for
white collar cases was 8.9 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2010, supra note 121,
at 83 tbl.D-4.
169. In 2009, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.0 percent and the white collar
nonconviction rate was 7.5 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2009, supra note 121,
at 82 tbl.D-4. In 2008, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.8 percent and the white collar
nonconviction rate was 8.8 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2008, supra note 121,
at 82 tbl.D-4; In 2007, the overall nonconviction rate was 10.3 percent and the white collar
nonconviction rate was 8.6 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2007, supra note 121,
at 81 tbl.D-4. In 2006, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.7 percent and the white collar
nonconviction rate was 8.2 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2006, supra note 121,
at 81 tbl.D-4. In 2005, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.6 percent and the white collar
nonconviction rate was 7.6 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2005, supra note 121,
at 81 tbl.D-4.
170. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the
Gradual Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226
(2007) (collecting and discussing sources and data showing the decline in trial rates across the
board in federal criminal cases during the 1990s and early 2000s). Federal criminal trials
decreased during the 1990s from a high of 8,947 trials in 1990 to 6,746 trials in 2000. Judicial
Facts and Figures 2005: Table 6.4, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialFactsAndFigures/2005/Table604.pdf. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of federal
criminal trials modestly rose to 7,477. Id. Between 2005 and 2010, the number continued to rise
and by 2010 had nearly reached the 1990 trial rate, with 8,445 federal criminal trials completed
in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2010. Judicial Facts and Figures 2010: Table 6.4, U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2010/Table604.
pdf.
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acquittal rate not because lawyers in those cases are no more effective
with juries but because more rigorous pretrial screening of weaker
cases offsets the effects of superior trial advocacy.
No empirical study has tested this hypothesis. It will be difficult
to test, given the obstacles to empirical study of prosecutorial
decisionmaking. The hypothesis is plausible in view of what is known
about how the criminal-justice system operates. Recently the
Supreme Court bracingly declared that plea bargaining “is the
171
criminal justice system.” The empiricist John Pfaff has produced a
potentially groundbreaking study finding that the source of soaring
incarceration rates in the United States has not been more arrests or
longer sentences but an increase in the number and frequency per
172
defendant of prosecutors lodging felony charges.
Criminal law scholars are in near complete agreement that
prosecutorial discretion now dominates the path that a particular case
173
follows in the criminal system, for several reasons. Chief among
those reasons are the huge overhang of substantive criminal law on
the books beyond any reasonable picture of what could be enforced;
the paucity of constitutional and statutory regulation of prosecutors’
decisions about whom and what to charge, and how to engage in plea
bargaining; and the severity and frequently mandatory nature of
sentencing law—coupled with the ability prosecutors typically have to
induce or even compel courts to enforce sentencing rules or relax
174
them.
171. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (quotation mark
omitted).
172. John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Populations 37–39 (Jan.
23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990508.
173. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 129, at 876–77 (“[A] prosecutor’s decision about what
charges to bring and what plea to accept amounts to a final adjudication in most criminal
cases.”); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 923–31 (2006) (describing how decisions of prosecutors drive sentencing results);
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REV. 393, 400–15 (2001) (“The charging decision is arguably the most important
prosecutorial power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of prosecutorial
discretion.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1521–23 (1981) (“The fate of most of those accused of crime is determined by prosecutors,
but typically this determination takes place out of public view . . . .”); see also Mark L. Miller &
Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 125–28 (2008) (citing extensive
scholarship concerned with prosecutorial power).
174. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1038–43 (2000)
(explaining that plea bargaining took control of criminal justice because it enhanced the power
of prosecutors and judges to dictate sentences and process cases); William J. Stuntz, Plea
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These dynamics have the potential to operate with no less force
in corporate crime than in street crime. As discussed in Parts I and II,
federal substantive law is broad and deep in the field of corporate
crime, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have the potential to be
steeply punitive in such cases. Criminal procedure is transsubstantive. Prosecutors have the same freedom in charging and
bargaining in corporate cases as in all criminal cases. And the Justice
Department does not place particularly stronger restraints on its
ground-level prosecutors’ decisions in the business realm than in
other areas.
One can see, however, how discretionary dynamics might
operate differently in cases with defense advocacy that is more
vigorous and intervenes earlier. Corporate criminal practice is
characterized by a kind and degree of defense lawyering at the
precharge stage that is virtually nonexistent in street crime cases.
White collar investigations are usually overt and typically lean toward
cooperative forms of evidence gathering, such as subpoenas and
interviews, as opposed to, for example, early morning raids with
search warrants and surprise arrests of potential accomplice
witnesses. There is no legal restriction on one’s ability to spend funds
on a criminal defense prior to charging, even though there is no
175
constitutional right at that stage to a lawyer’s help. Especially if
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2551–58 (2004)
(arguing that the structure and scope of substantive criminal law enables prosecutors to dictate
pleas, which are no longer bargains struck meaningfully in the shadow of legal rights and
liabilities). The tide may be turning in judicial attitudes toward regulation of plea bargaining,
despite the longstanding doctrine that controls the process only lightly. See Stephanos Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 1117, 1138–42 (2011) (discussing how, now that plea bargaining has become the norm in
criminal prosecutions, it “needs tailored regulation in its own right, not simply a series of
waivers of trial rights”). Compare Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405–08 (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel extends to consideration of plea agreements), Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383–88 (2012) (same), and Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359–74
(2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel extends to informing the
defendant of the risk of deportation), with Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372–73 (1978)
(reaffirming broad prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining), and Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 756–57 (1970) (holding that plea bargaining is not coercive in violation of the due
process clause even if a life sentence is offered as an alternative to the possibility of being
executed).
175. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 373 (2006) (“Actions by the government
that affected only the payment of legal fees and defense costs for services rendered prior to the
indictment . . . do not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”); see also Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the
only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.”).
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joint defense agreements are in use, the corporate actor and her
counsel may have near full access to the flow of documents and
statements that the government receives, and thereby an ability to
know or at least predict what the government is doing with its
176
investigation, and sometimes what it is likely to do next. (The
comfort with this kind of system may explain, in part, the sense of
unfairness expressed around Wall Street when the government
177
recently deployed wiretaps in insider-trading cases. )
As discussed in Part IV, it is difficult to assess clearly the net
position of the white collar offender in criminal investigations. On the
one hand, the evidence against her generally consists of documents
and the statements of others, which she has little ability to prevent
from landing in the state’s possession and even less ability to exclude
from the universe of trial proof. The practice of using the threat of
firm-level criminal liability to persuade corporations to gather
evidence of their own employees’ wrongdoing and provide it to the
government dramatically reduces the corporate offender’s ability to
178
prevent the government from building a case against her. And doing
defense lawyers’ work in big, complex corporate crime cases involving
hundreds of witnesses and millions of documents consumes resources
at a rate not often encountered in street crime defense.

176. An important dimension of this question is the possibly ambiguous relationship
between the position of the offending employee of a corporation and the explosion in the role of
the corporate criminal defense lawyer which Weisselberg and Li document. See generally
Weisselberg & Li, supra note 13. On the one hand, the prevalence of the modern corporate
investigation has compelled large firms to purchase insurance covering defense costs and to
bring more lawyers on the scene when law violations may be afoot, to do so as early as possible,
and to supply representation for employees, including those who may have been involved in
wrongdoing. Id. at 1268–72. On the other hand, the employee in the corporate case may find her
range of options restricted in ways that are particular to corporate criminal cases: she may find
herself unable meaningfully to rely on her Fifth Amendment privilege and her attorney, funded
by the firm and often party to a joint defense agreement, may not provide the utmost
independent judgment that might come with a private lawyer chosen by the employee. See
Griffin, supra note 146, at 333–40 (discussing the additional risks to employees as individuals);
N. Richard Janis, Ensuring Employee Rights in Internal Investigations, 36 HUM. RTS., Spring
2009, at 10, 10 (discussing the representation of employees in internal investigations).
177. See Dennis Berman, Galleon’s Legacy: Wiretapping Insider Crime, WALL ST. J., May
12, 2011, at C1 (noting that wiretapping “just wasn’t the way things were done” with Wall Street
cases); see also Peter J. Henning, The Pitfalls of Wiretaps in White Collar Crime Cases, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 25, 2011, 3:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/thepitfalls-of-wiretaps-in-white-collar-crime-cases (noting the problems with using wiretaps in
white collar cases including increased privacy concerns).
178. See Arlen, supra note 73, at 144, 167–72.
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On the other hand, the practice (as opposed to the law) of
criminal investigation in the white collar arena affords the subject of a
corporate criminal investigation considerable informational
advantages. The bare existence of counsel at the investigation stage
can restrict the government’s ability to engage in some kinds of
surprise interrogations and other common tactics for gathering
179
evidence in street crime investigations.
These informational advantages may cash out more in
negotiation than in litigation. As legal scholars Kenneth Mann and,
later, Gerard Lynch famously documented, white collar criminal
practice includes an entire phase of quasi procedure that is virtually
180
nonexistent in the prosecution of street crime. The charging
decision in corporate cases usually follows a kind of negotiation or
litigation that involves pitches from defense lawyers to prosecutors—
under circumstances in which the defense has knowledge of much of
the prosecutor’s evidence. This process can include extensive
meetings in which the parties discuss the facts, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, and the nature of the offense and
comparable prosecutions—all the same things likely to influence
decisionmakers such as judges, jurors, and probation officers in an
actual criminal prosecution. The process even includes informal levels
of appeal, as defense attorneys work their way up the hierarchy in the
prosecutor’s office. (I have heard members of the corporate criminal
defense bar say that their practice primarily involves “conference
room litigation.”) This system of precharge procedure amounts to an
additional bite at the apple—though it comes first—to which street
offenders almost never have access.
Couple these considerations with the prosecutor’s likely
calculation—accurate or not—that trial of a corporate crime case will
encounter better defense advocacy, more complexity, and more

179. This advantage for the corporate offender is explained lucidly in John G. Douglass,
Jimmy Hoffa’s Revenge: White Collar Rights Under the McDade Amendment, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 123, 129–39 (2002).
180. The seminal study of the strikingly different role of the white collar defense lawyer
from the street crime lawyer in criminal investigations is KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITECOLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985). Mann, basing his findings on
an interview study involving the New York bar, documented at length the special role of the
white collar defense lawyer in gaining and controlling information. Id. at 6–8; see also
WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 99 (discussing the early involvement of counsel and the
importance of early skilled counsel in negotiating and staving off or reducing charges); Gerard
E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2125–29
(1998) (describing the process of precharge quasi adjudication by federal prosecutors).
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difficulty with a jury than the ordinary criminal case. One can see why
prosecutors might be more apt to decline to charge in the corporate
case, or more likely to offer an irresistible discount in plea bargaining.
The revolving door provides further support for the hypothesis
that superior defense resources produce selection effects. If one
thinks that federal prosecutors are self-maximizing and that their
utility functions include a strong desire for lucrative private sector
work following public employment, then one might predict that they
would manage their cases in order to produce two things: verifiable
experience in conducting high-level, complex corporate investigations
and prosecutions; and a perception of wisdom and balance among a
bar that includes those who make hiring decisions and refer client
work. The object would be to both prosecute big cases and dispose of
cases “reasonably” in the eyes of the defense bar.
The data again complicate matters. White collar cases, it turns
181
out, plead out at essentially the same rate as all others. Once the
prosecutor has decided to level charges, the white collar offender
appears to be just as overborne by the government’s power in plea
bargaining as anyone else—maybe more so if one thinks the
corporate defendant would tend, for a variety of reasons, to be more
risk averse toward imprisonment than the street offender.
C. Charging Decisions
Selection effects may still loom large. If some potential charges
and penalties are whittled away in the precharging phase, then the
white collar offender will face less pressure at the formal stage of
pretrial proceedings or trial. The rate of guilty pleas may be
unaffected, but the outcomes may be more favorable relative to
181. Between 2005 and 2011, about 88 percent of all federal criminal cases resulted in a
guilty plea. White collar cases pled out at approximately the same rate, with embezzlement,
fraud, and forgery cases pleading out at an average rate of 89 percent. See ADMIN. OFFICE,
STATISTICAL TABLES 2005, supra note 121, at 81 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL
TABLES 2006, supra note 121, at 81 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2007, supra
note 121, at 81 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2008, supra note 121, at 82 tbl.D4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2009, supra note 121, at 82 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE,
STATISTICAL TABLES 2010, supra note 121, at 83 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 69 tbl.D-4 (2012),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederal
Judiciary/2011/Dec-11/D04Dec11.pdf; see also Stephanos Bibas, White Collar Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 723–32 (2005) (describing the heavy
increases in sentences and prosecutorial leverage in white collar cases from the 1990s into the
2000s, and speculating about a possible decrease in such leverage following the Supreme Court’s
ruling that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not binding).
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worst-case scenarios. The empirical difficulty is that decisions not to
pursue cases by prosecutors who operate in the exceedingly
discretionary arena of corporate crime enforcement are not
measurable or even observable. All I can say is that I have heard
defense lawyers celebrate over nonprosecution decisions for
individual clients to such a degree that the event would seem to be
uncommon, at least once a criminal investigation gets going in
earnest. And of course there is the familiar complaint—particularly
strong in the debate over the virtues and vices of independent
counsels—that prosecutors feel compelled to level some sort of
charge and get some sort of conviction once they have been tasked
182
with a major investigation.
A tentative answer to the question about privilege in defense
resources might be as follows. The most likely point of resource
leverage for the corporate offender is at the stage of informal
negotiation and litigation over charging decisions and, perhaps to a
lesser extent, plea bargains. The degree of that leverage relative to
the street offender is difficult to quantify. From one viewpoint, the
leverage is enormous because the street defendant typically enjoys no
assistance at all in the process by which prosecutors investigate crime
and choose whether and what to charge. From another perspective,
the white collar defense bar would contend that advocacy at the point
183
of prosecutorial discretion is essential in white collar cases. The
fuzzy boundaries in the business realm between crimes and merely
civil violations, the bar would say, often mean that the difference
between imprisonment and freedom is the idiosyncratic judgment of
one or a few executive-branch officials about whether something is
“really” a crime.
Once again, those who perceive an unfair advantage to corporate
criminals are raising more fundamental questions than they may
realize. As a descriptive matter, corporate crime just is different than
street crime in American society. As a result of both political

182. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the dangers inherent in broad prosecutorial discretion); Jerry Ross, Avoiding
Captain Ahabs: Lessons from the Office of the Independent Counsel, 35 ADMIN. & SOC. 334,
334–37 (2003) (noting that social and psychological factors incentivize prosecutors to close cases
for the least cost).
183. See generally Lev L. Dassin & Guy Petrillo, Making Presentations to the United States
Attorney’s Office and the Department of Justice, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 112, § 5 (discussing the multitude
of factors that clients must consider when confronting potential criminal charges).
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disagreement and genuine conceptual challenges, there is far less
consensus in the field of economic activities than elsewhere about
what “oughta be a crime.” That dissensus is evident in, among other
places, ambivalence about whether the business crime defendant
needs a special kind of legal defense, or rather does not deserve
different treatment at all.
The thought experiment might again be revealing: What would
the criminal-justice system look like if one set about to remove any
advantage the corporate criminal defendant enjoys from greater
defense resources? Three alternatives spring to mind. One could
massively increase funding for indigent defense. Given the costs
presently incurred in defending corporate cases, one would have to
break the public fisc to produce level funding. One could limit the
amount of spending on private defense, directly or perhaps through a
tax that would help fund indigent defense. But that would require
amending the Constitution. Or one could try to legislate a revolution
in the practice of white collar criminal defense by requiring the
government to investigate such crimes behind a wall that closes off
the defense bar from the government’s evidence and the prosecutor’s
decisions about charging and plea offers. For maximizing information
relevant to important decisions, that would seem to cut off the
system’s nose to spite its face.
CONCLUSION
Justifying existing arrangements in the field of corporate crime
enforcement has not been the purpose of the preceding discussion.
The object has been to place in clear view the nature of any plausible
claim that the American criminal-justice system privileges the
individual corporate offender. This clarity can be produced by
familiarity with the particulars of corporate criminal law and its
current practice, examination of available data, and consideration of
the forms of change that would be required to reorder the relative
positions of corporate and street offenders.
Sentencing law and practice no longer privilege the individual
corporate defendant. Substantive criminal law, if anything, is less
favorable to white collar offenders than others. Trans-substantive
doctrines of procedure and evidence do not themselves contain
features that white collar defendants can particularly exploit.
Enforcement institutions, as constructed and operated, privilege the
corporate offender only if one holds the belief that the present
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capitalist economic system could coexist with the kind of intrusive
policing techniques routinely applied to violent and other street
crimes. A great advantage in defense resources is available to the
corporate employee subject to the criminal process. That resource
advantage likely produces some discretionary amelioration of charges
and plea offers that is not quantifiable. But it is hard to see how one
could level criminal cases on the dimension of defense resources
without radically changing the American conception of rights to
representation.
The argument that corporate criminals are privileged, it turns
out, originates in an external point of view on law and legal
institutions. Critics of present treatment of corporate crime are
implicitly advocating more fundamental and consequential changes
than they generally acknowledge or perhaps realize. A viable
argument about privilege would bid Americans to adopt new
perspectives on what to call a crime, how to police economic activity
with enforcement institutions, and how to contest suspicions and
accusations of serious wrongdoing.
Such contentions deserve serious responses. They have reform
implications more profound than one would think from observing the
recent skirmishing over corporate crime in the public square. And
they thrust the subject of corporate crime into the fray of debate over
America’s impulse to ask criminal law to relieve its frustrations with
intractable regulatory problems. The foregoing discussion should help
structure and clarify such important normative debates.

